

Of the aduancement of learning,

Predicaments, are but Cautions against the confusion of *Definitions* and *Diuisions*.

Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the Impression, and not by the subtiltie of the Illaqueation, not so much perplexing the Reason, as ouer-ruling it by power of the *Imagination*. But this part I thinke more proper to handle, when I shall speake of R H E T O R I C K E.

But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kinde of Fallacies in the Minde of Man, which I finde not obserued or enquired at all, and thinke good to place heere, as that which of all others appertayneth most to rectifie I V D I G E M E N T. The force whereof is such, as it doth not dazle, or snare the vnderstanding in some particulars, but doth more generally, and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of Man is farre from the Nature of a cleare and equall glasse, wherein the beames of things should reflect according to their true incidence; Nay, it is rather like an enchanted glasse, full of superstition and Imposture, if it bee not deliuered and reduced. For this purpose, lette vs consider the false appearances, that are imposed vpon vs by the generall Nature of the minde, behoulding them in an example or twoo, as firste in that instance which is the roote of all superstition: Namely, *That to the Nature of the Minde of all Men it is consonant for the Affimative, or Actiue to affect*

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affect, more than the negative or Priuatiue. So that a fewe times hitting, or presence, counteruayles oft times fayling, or absence, as was well answered by *Diagoras*, to him that shewed him in *Neptunes* Temple, the great number of pictures, of such as had scaped Shippe-wracke, and had paide their Vowes to *Neptune*, saying: *Aduise nowe, you that thinke it folly to inuocate Neptune in tempest: Yea, but* (sayth *Diagoras*) *where are they painted that are drowned?* Lette vs behould it in another instance, namely, *That the spirite of man, beeing of an equall and vnifourme substance, doth vsually suppose and faine in Nature a greater equalitie and vniformitie, than is in truth;* Hence it commeth, that the *Mathematicians* cannot satisfie themselues, except they reduce the Motions of the Celestiall bodyes, to perfect Circles, reiecting spirall lynes, and laboring to be discharged of Eecentriques. Hence it commeth, that whereas there are many thinges in Nature, as it were *Monodica: sui Iuris;* Yet the cogitations of Man, doe fayne vnto them *Relatiues, Paralleles, and Coniugates*, whereas no such thinge is; as they haue fayned an Element of Fire to keepe square with Earth, Water, and Ayre, and the like; Nay, it is not credible, till it bee opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies, the similitude of humane Actions, & Arts, together with the making of Man *Communis Mensura*, haue brought into naturall Philosophie: not much better, than the Heresie of the *Anthropomorphites* bredde in the Celles

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of grosse and solitarie Monkes, and the opinion of *Epicurus*, answerable to the same in heathenisme, who supposed the Gods to be of humane Shape. And therefore *Velleius* the Epicurian needed not to haue asked, why God should haue adorned the Heauens with Starres, as if he had beene an *Aedilis*: One that should haue set foorth some magnificent shewes or playes? for if that great Worke-master had beene of an Humane disposition, hee would haue caste the starres into some pleasant and beautifull workes, and orders, like the frettes in the Roofes of Houses, whereas one can scarce finde a Posture in square, or triangle, or streight line amonge such an infinite number, so differing an Harmonie, there is betweene the spirite of Man, and the spirite of Nature.

Lette vs consider againe, the false appearances imposed vpon vs by euerie Mans owne indiuiduall Nature and Custome in that fayned supposition, that *Plato* maketh of the Caue: for certainly, if a childe were continued in a Grotte or Caue, vnder the Earth, vntill maturitie of age, and came suddainely abroad, hee would haue strange and absurd Imaginations; So in like manner, although our persons liue in the view of Heauen, yet our spirites are included in the Caues of our owne complexions and customes: which minister vnto vs infinite Errours and vaine opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But heereof wee haue

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haue giuen many examples in one of the Errors, or peccant humours, which wee runne briefly ouer in our first Booke.

And lastly, lette vs consider the false appearances, that are imposed vpon vs by words, which are framed, and applyed according to the conceit, and capacities of the Vulgar sorte: And although wee thinke we gouerne our wordes, and prescribe it well. *Loquendum vt Vulgus, sentiendum vt sapientes*: Yet certaine it is, that wordes, as a *Tartars* Bowe, doe shoote backe vpon the vnderstanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle, and peruert the Iudgement. So as it is almost necessarie in all controuersies and disputations, to imitate the wisdome of the *Mathematicians*, in setting downe in the verie beginning, the definitions of our wordes and termes, that others may knowe howe wee accept and vnderstand them, and whether they concurre with vs or no. For it commeth to passe for want of this, that we are sure to end there where wee ought to haue begun, which is in questions & differences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be conferred, that it is not possible to diuorce our selues from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our Nature and Condition of life; So yet neuertheless the Caution of them (for all *Elenches* as was saide, are but Cautions) doth extreemely importe the true conducte of Humane Iudgement. The particular *Elenches* or *Cautions* against these

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*Elenchi
magni, sive
Iuolis, ani-
mi huma-
ni, natius
& aduen-
titijs.*

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these three false appearances, I finde altogether deficient.

There remaineth one parte of Iudgement of great excellencie, which to mine vnderstanding is so slightly touched, as I maye reporte that also deficient, which is the application of the differing kindes of Proofes, to the differing kindes of Subjects: for there beeing but foure kindes of demonstrations, that is by the immediate consent of the *Minde* or *Sence*; by *Induction*; by *Sophisme*; and by *Congruitie*, which is that which *Aristotle* calleth *Demonstration in Orbe, or Circle*, and not a *Notioribus*, euerie of these hath certaine Subjects in the Matter of Sciences, in which respectiuelly they haue chiefest vse; and certaine other, from which respectiuelly they ought to be excluded, and the rigour, and curiositie, in requiring the more seuerer Proofes in some thinges, and chiefly the facilitie in contenting our selues with the more remisse Proofes in others, hath beene amongst the greatest causes of detryment and hinderance to Knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the Analogie of Sciences, I note as deficient.

De Analogia Demonstrationum.

The Custodie or retayning of Knowledge, is either in WRITING or MEMORIE; whereof WRITING hath two partes; The Nature of the CHARACTER, and the order of the

ENTRIE,

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ENTRIE: for the Art of *Characters*, or other visible notes of Wordes or thinges, it hath neereft coniugation with Grammar, and therefore I referre it to the due place; for the *Disposition* and *Collocation* of that Knowledge which wee preserve in Writing; It consisteth in a good Digest of Common Places, wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the vse of *Common-Place Bookes*, as causing a retardation of Reading, and some sloth or relaxation of Memorie. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in Knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man bee deepe and full; I should the Entrie of Common places, to be a matter of great vse and essence in studying; as that which assureth of copie Invention, and contracteth Iudgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the *Methodes* of *Common places*, that I haue seen, there is none of any sufficient woorth, all of them carying meerely the face of a *Schoole*, and not of a *World*, and referring to vulgar matters, and Pedanticall Diuisions without all life, or respect to Action.

*illud sta
reminer
posse al
solidi
liqua sci
passare
locoy
miv ad
hione. Al*

For the other Principall Parte of the Custodie of Knowledge, which is MEMORIE; I finde that facultie in my Iudgement weakely enquired of; An Art there is extant of it; But it seemeth to me that there are better Precepts, than that Art; and better practises of that Art, than those receiued. It is certaine, the Art (as it is) may bee rayed to points of ostentation prodigious: But in vse (as it is nowe

P p 2 mannaged)

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mannaged) it is barren, not burdensome, nor dangerous to Naturall *Memorie*, as is imagined, but barren, that is, not dexterous to be applyed to the serious use of businesse and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of Names or Wordes vpon once hearing; or the powring forth of a number of Verses or Rimes *ex tempore*; or the making of a *Satyricall Smile* of euerie thinge, or the turning of euerie thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of euerie thing by *Cauill*, or the like (whereof in the faculties of the *Minde*, there is great Copie, and such, as by deuise and practise may be exalted to an extreame degree of woonder;) than I doe of the trickes of *Tumblers*, *Funambuloz*, *Baladynes*; the one being the same in the *Minde*, that the other is in the bodie; Matters of strangenesse without worthynesse.

This Art of *Memorie*, is but built vpon two Intentions: The one *Prænotion*; the other *Emblemic*: *Prænotion*, dischargeth the Indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth vs to seeke in a narrowe Compasse: that is, somewhat that hath Congruitie with our *Place of Memorie*: *Emblemic* reduceth conceits intellectuall to Images sensible, which strike the *Memorie* more; out of which *Axiomes* may be drawne much better Praëctique, than that in use, and besides which *Axiomes*, there are diuers moe, touching helpe of *Memorie*, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish,

not

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not to report those thinges deficient, which are but onely ill Managed.

There remaineth the fourth kinde of RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE, which is transitiue, concerning the *expressing* or *transferring* our Knowledge to others, which I will tearme by the generall name of TRADITION OR DELIVERIE. TRADITION hath three partes: the first concerning the ORGANE OF TRADITION: the second, concerning the METHODE OF TRADITION: And the thirde, concerning the ILLUSTRATION OF TRADITION.

For the ORGANE OF TRADITION, it is either SPEECH OR WRITING: for *Aristotle* sayth well: *Wordes are the Images of Cogitations, and Letters are the Images of Wordes*: But yet is not of necessitie, that *Cogitations* be expressed by the *Medium of Wordes*. For *what soeuer is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense; is in Nature competent to expresse Cogitations*: And therefore we see in the Commerce of barbarous People, that vnderstand not one anothers language, & in the practise of diuers that are dumb & deafe, that mens minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serue the turne. And we vnderstand further, that it is the use of *Chyna*, and the Kingdomes of the High *Leuant*, to write in *Characters reall*, which expresse neither *Letters, nor words in grosse*, but *Things* or *Notions*: in so much as Countreys and Prouinces, which vnderstand not one anothers language, can neuerthelesse read one anothers Writings, because

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the *Characters* are accepted more generally, than the *Languages* doe extend; and therefore they haue a vast multitude of *Characters*, as many (I suppose, as Radicall words.

These *Notes of Cogitations* are of two sortes; The one when the Note hath some *Similitude*, or *Congruitie* with the *Notion*; The other *Ad Placitum*, hauing force onely by *Contract* or *Acceptation*. Of the former sort are *Hieroglyphickes*, and *Gestures*. For as to *Hieroglyphickes*, (things of Ancient vse, and embraced chiefly by the *Aegyptians*, one of the most ancient Nations) they are but as continued *Impreases* and *Emblemes*. And as for *Gestures*, they are as *Transitorie Hieroglyphickes*, and are to *Hieroglyphickes*, as *Words spoken* are to *Words written*, in that they abide not; but they haue euermore as well, as the other an affinitie with the things signified: as *Periander* beeing consulted with how to preferue a tyrannie newly vsurped, bid the *Messenger* attend, and report what hee sawe him doe, and went into his Garden, and topped all the highest flowers: signifying that it consisted in the cutting off, and keeping low of the Nobilitie and *Grandes*; *Ad Placitum*, are the *Characters* reall before mentioned, and *Words*: although some haue ben willing by Curious Enquirie, or rather by apt fayning, to haue deuised imposition of Names, from Reason and Intendment: a speculation elegant, and by reason it searcheth into *Antiquitie* reuerent: but sparingly
mixt

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mixt with truth, and of small fruite. This portion of knowledge, touching the *Notes of things*, *De Notis* and *Cogitations* in generall, I finde not enquired, *Rerum*. but deficient. And although it may seeme of no great vse, considering that *Words*, and *Writings* by *letters*, doe far excell all the other wayes: yet because this part concerneth, as it were the Mint of knowledge (for wordes, are the tokens currant and accepted for conceits, as *Moneys* are for values and that it is fit men be not ignorant, that *Moneys* may bee of another kind, than gold and siluer) I thought good to propound it to better Enquirie.

Concerning *SPEECH* and *WORDES*, the Consideration of them hath produced the Science of *GRAMMAR*: for *Man* still striueth to re-integrate himselfe in those benedictions, from which by his fault hee hath been deprived; And as hee hath striuen against the first generall Curse, by the Inuention of all other Artes: So hath hee sought to come foorth of the seconde generall Curse, (which was the confusion of Tongues) by the Art of *GRAMMAR*; whereof the vse in another tongue is small: in a mother tongue more: but most in such *Forraine Tongues*, as haue ceased to be *Vulgar Tongues*, and are turned onely to *learned tongues*. The duetie of it is of two Natures: The one *Popular*, which is for the speedie, and perfect attayning Languages, as well for intercourse of Speech, as for vnderstanding of Authors: The other *Philosophicall*, examining the power and Na-

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ture of Wordes, as they are the foot-steppes and prints of Reason: which kinde of *Analogie* betweene *Wordes*, and *Reason* is handled *Sparſim*, brokenly, though not entirely: and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I thinke it verie worthy to be reduced into a Science by it ſelfe.

Vnto GRAMMAR also belongeth, as an Appendix, the conſideration of the Accidents of Wordes, which are Measure, ſound, and Eleuation, or Accent, and the ſweeteneſſe and harſhneſſe of them: whence hath yſſued ſome curious obſeruations in *Rhetoricke*, but chiefly *Poeſie*, as wee conſider it, in reſpect of the verſe, and not of the Argument: wherein though men in learned Tongues, doe tye themſelues to the Ancient Measures, yet in moderne Languages, it ſeemeth to me, as free to make newe Measures of Verſes, as of Daunces: For a Daunce is a measured pace, as a Verſe is a measured Speech. In theſe thinges the Sence is better Iudge, than the Art.

*Cæna ferula noſtra;
Mallem conuiuis, quam placuiſſe Cocis.*

And of the ſeruile expreſſing *Antiquitie* in an vnlike and an vnfit Subiect, it is well ſayd, *Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate eſt maxime nouum.*

For CYPHARS; they are commonly in Letters or Alphabets, but may bee in Wordes. The
kindeſ

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kindeſ of CYPHARS, (beſides the SIMPLE CYPHARS with Changes, and intermixtures of NVLLES, and NONSIGNIFICANTS) are many, according to the Nature or Rule of the inſoulding: WHEEL-CYPHARS, KAY-CYPHARS, DOVBLES, &c. But the vertues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and reade; that they bee impoſſible to diſcyphe; and in ſome caſes, that they bee without ſuſpition. The higheſt Degree whereof, is to write OMNIA PER OMNIA; which is vndoubtedly poſſible, with a proportion Quintuple at moſt, of the writing inſoulding, to the writing inſoulded, and no other reſtrainte whatſoeuer. This Arte of *Cyphering*, hath for Relatiue, an Art of *Diſcyphering*; by ſuppoſition vnprofitable; but, as things are, of great vſe. For ſuppoſe that *Cyphars* were well manag'd, there bee Multitudes of them which exclude the *Diſcypherer*. But in regarde of the rawneſſe and vnſkilfulneſſe of the handes, through which they paſſe, the greateſt Matters, are many times carryed in the weakeſt *Cyphars*.

In the Enumeration of theſe priuate and retyred Artes, it may bee thought I ſeeke to make a greate Muſter-Rowle of Sciences; nameinge them for ſhewe and oſtentation, and to little other purpoſe. But lette thoſe which are ſkilfull

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in them iudge, whether I bring them in onely for apparance, or whether in that which I speake of them (though in fewe Words) there be not some seede of proficiencie. And this must bee remembered, that as there bee many of great account in their Countreys and Prouinces, which when they come vp to the Seate of the Estate, are but of meane Ranke and scarcely regarded: So these Arts being heere placed with the principall, and supreme Sciences, seeme petty thinges: yet to such as haue chosen them to spende their labors and studies in them, they seeme great Matters.

For the METHODE OF TRADITION, I see it hath mooued a Controuersie in our time. But as in Ciuile businesse, if there bee a meeting and men fall at Wordes, there is commonly an end of the Matter for that time, and no proceeding at all: So in Learning, where there is much controuersie, there is many times little Enquirie. For this part of knowledge of *Method* seemeth to mee so weakely enquired, as I shall report it deficient.

METHODE hath beene placed, and that not amisse in *Logicke*, as a part of *Iudgement*; For as the Doctrine of *Syllogismes* comprehendeth the rules of Iudgement vpon that which is *inuented*; So the Doctrine of *Method* contayneth the rules of *Iudgement* vpon that which is to bee deliue-
red,

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red, for *Iudgement* precedeth *Deliuerie*, as it followeth *Inuentions*. Neither is the METHODE, or the NATURE OF THE TRADITION materiall onely to the *Vse* of Knowledge, but likewise to the *Progression* of Knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man, cannot attaine to perfection of Knowledge; the *Wisdom* of the *Tradition*, is that which inspireth the felicitie of continuance, and proceeding. And therefore the most reall diuersitie of *Method*, is of METHODE REFERRED TO VSE, and METHODE REFERRED TO PROGRESSION, whereof the one may bee termed MAGISTRALL, and the other of PROBATION.

The later whereof seemeth to be *Via deserta & interclusa*. For as Knowledges are now deliuered, there is a kinde of Contract of Errour, betweene the Deliuerer, and the Receiuer: for he that deliuereth knowledge; desireth to deliuer it in such forme, as may be best beleued; and not as may best examined: and hee that receiueth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant Enquirie, & so rather not to doubt, than not to erre: glorie making the Author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the Disciple not to knowe his strength.

But knowledge, that is deliuered as a threade to bee spunne on, ought to bee deliuered and intimated, if it were possible, *In the same Methode wherein it was inuented*; and so is it possible of know-
ledge

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ledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge; no man knoweth howe hee came to the knowledge which hee hath obtayned. But yet neuertheless *Secundum maius & minus*, a man may reuifite, and descend vnto the foundations of his Knowledge and Consent: and so transplant it into another, as it grewe in his owne Minde. For it is in Knowledges, as it is in Plantes; if you meane to vse the Plant, it is no matter for the Rootes: But if you meane to remooue it to growe, then it is more assured to rest vppon rootes, than slippes: So the deliuerie of Knowledges (as it is nowe vsed) is as of faire bodies of Trees without the Rootes: good for the Carpenter, but not for the Planter: But if you will haue Sciences growe; it is lesse matter for the shafte, or bodie of the Tree, so you looke well to the takinge vp of the Rootes. Of which kinde of deliuerie the *Method* of the *Mathematicques*, in that Subiect, hath some shadowe; but generally I see it neither put in vre, nor put in Inquisition: and therefore note it for deficient.

*De Methodo syn-
cera, siue
ad filios
Scientiarum.*

Another diuersitie of *METHODE* there is, which hath some affinitie with the former, vsed in some cases, by the discretion of the Auncients; but disgraced since by the Impostures of many vaine persons, who haue made it as a false light for their counterfeite Marchandizes; and that is Enigmaticall and Disclosed. The pretence where-
of,

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of, is to remooue the vulgar Capacities from being admitted to the secretes of Knowledges, and to reserue them to selected Auditors: or wittes of such sharpnesse as can pearce the wayle.

Another diuersitie of *METHODE*, whereof the consequence is great, is the deliuerie of knowledge in *APHORISMES*, or in *METHODES*; wherein wee may obserue, that it hath bene too much taken into Custome, out of a fewe *Axiomes* or *Observations*, vppon any Subiecte, to make a solemne, and formall Art; filling it with some Discourses, and illustrating it with Examples; and digesting it into a sensible *Method*: But the writinge in *APHORISMES*, hath manye excellent vertues, whereto the writinge in *Method* doth not approach.

For first, it tryeth the Writer, whether hee be superficial or solide: For *Aphorismes*, except they should bee ridiculous, cannot bee made but of the pyth and heart of Sciences: for discourse of illustration is cut off, Recitales of Examples are cut off: Discourse of Connexion, and order is cut off; Descriptions of Practize, are cutte off; So there remayneth nothings to fill the *Aphorismes*, but some good quantitie of Observation: And therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write *Aphorismes*, but hee that is found and grounded. But in *Methodes*,

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Tantum

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*Tantum Series iuncturaque Pollet,
Tantum de Medio sumptis, accedit honoris:*

As a Man shall make a great shew of an Art, which if it were disioynted, would come to little. Secondly, *Methodes* are more fit to winne Consent; or beleefe; but lesse fit to point to Action; for they carrie a kinde of Demonstration in Orbe or Circle, one part illuminating another; and therefore satisfie. But particulars beeing dispersed, doe best agree with dispersed directions. And lastlye *Aphorismes*, representing a knowledge broken, doe inuite men to enquire further; whereas *Methodes* carrying the shewe of a Totall, doe secure men; as if they were at furthest.

Another Diuersitie of METHODE, which is likewise of great weight, is, The handling of knowledge by *Affertions*, and *their Proojes*; or by *Questions*, and *their Determinations*: The latter kinde whereof, if it bee immoderately followed, is as preiudiciall to the proceeding of Learning, as it is to the proceedinge of an Armie, to goe about to besiege euerie little Forte, or Holde. For if the Field bee kept, and the summe of the Enterprize pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselues; Indeede a Man would not leaue some important peece Enemie at his backe. In like manner, the vse of Confutation in the deliuerie of Sciences ought to be verie sparing;

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ring; and to serue to remouue stronge Preoccupations and Preiudgements, and not to minister and excite Disputations and doubts.

Another Diuersitie of *Methodes*, is, *According to the Subiect or Matter, which is handled*. For there is a great difference in Deliuerie of the *Mathematiques*, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and *Policie*, which is the most immerfed; And howloeuver conention hath been moued, touching an *uniformitie* of *Methodes* in *Multiformitie* of Matter: Yet wee see howe that opinion, besides the weakenesse of it, hath beene of ill desert, towards Learning, as that which taketh the way, to reduce Learning to certaine emptie and barren Generalities; beeing but the verie Huskes, and Shales of Sciences, all the kernell beeing forced out, and expelled, with the torture and presse of the *Methodes*: And therefore as I did allow well of *particular topiques* for *Inuention*: so I doe allow likewise of *particular Methodes* of *Tradition*.

Another Diuersitie of *Iudgement* in the deliuerie and teaching of knowledge, is, *According vnto the light and presuppositions of that which is deliuered*: For that knowledge, which is newe and forreine from opinions receiued, is to bee deliuered in another forme, than that that is agreeable and familiar; And therefore *Aristotle*, when he thinkes to taxe *Democritus*, doth in truth, commend him; where hee sayth: *If wee shall indeede dispute, and not fol-*

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lowe after *Similitudes*, &c. For those, whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, neede onely but to prooue or dispute: but those, whose Conceits are beyonde popular opinions, haue a double labour; the one to make themselves conceiued, and the other to prooue and demonstrate. So that it is of necessitie with them to haue recourse to *Similitudes*, and translations, to expresse themselves. And therefore in the Infancie of Learning, and in rude times, when those Conceits, which are now triuiall, were then newe; the World was full of *Parables* and *Similitudes*; for else would men either haue passed ouer without Marke, or else reiected for Paradoxes, that which was offered; before they had vnderstoode or iudged. So; in Diuine Learning, wee see howe frequent *Parables* and *Tropes* are; For it is a Rule, *That whatsoever Science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in ayde of Similitudes.*

There be also other Diuersities of *METHODES* vulgar and receiued: as that of *Resolution*, or *Analysis*, of *Constitution*, or *Systasis*, of *Concealement*, or *Cryptique*, &c. which I doe allowe well of; though I haue stood vpon those which are least handied and obserued. All which I haue remembred to this purpose, because I would erecte and constitute one generall Enquirie (which seeme to mee deficient) touching the *Wisdom*e of *Tradition*.

But vnto this part of Knowledge, concerning *METHODE*, doth further belong, not onely the *Architecture*

De prudentia
Traditionis

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Architecture of the whole frame of a Worke, but also the severall beames and Columnes thereof; not as to their stufte, but as to their quantitie, and figure: And therefore, *Method*e considereth, not onely the disposition of the *Argument* or *Subject*, but likewise the *Propositions*: not as to their *Truth* or *Matter*, but as to their *Limitation* and *Manner*. For herein *Ramus* merited better a great deale, in reuiuing the good Rules of *Propositions*, *Καθὼς πρῶτον Κατὰ παντός*, &c. than he did in introducing the Canker of *Epitomes*: And yet, (as it is the Condition of Humane thinges, that according to the ancient Fables, *The most pretious thinges haue the most pernitious Keepers*) It was so, that the attempt of the one, made him fall vpon the other. For hee had neede be well conducted, that should designe to make *Axiomes* *Conuertible*: If he make them not withall *Circular*, and *Non promouent*, or *Incurring into themselves*: but yet the Intention was excellent.

The other Considerations of *Method*e, concerning *Propositions*, are chiefly touching the vtmost *Propositions*, which limit the Dimensions of Sciences: for euerie Knowledge may bee fitly sayd, besides the *Profunditie* (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it *solide*) to haue a *Longitude*, and a *Latitude*: accounting the latitude towards other Sciences: and the Longitude towards *Action*: that is, from the greatest *Generallitie*, to the most particular *Precept*: The one

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giueth Rule howe farre one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the Prouince of another, which is the Rule they call *Καθυστο*. The other giueth Rule, vnto what degree of particularitie, a knowledge should descend: which latter I finde passed ouer in silence; being in my Iudgement, the more materiall. For certainly, there must bee somewhat left to practise; but howe much is worthy the Enquirie: wee see remote and superficiall Generalities, doe but offer Knowledge, to scorne of practicall men: and are no more ayding to practise, than an *Ortelius* vniuersall Mappe, is to direct the way betweene *London* and *Yorke*. The better sort of Rules, haue beene not vnfitly compared to glasses of Steele vnpullished; where you may see the Images of thinges, but first they must bee filed: So the Rules will helpe, if they bee laboured and pullished by practise. But howe Christallyne they may bee made at the first, and howe farre forth they may be pullished afore-hand, is the question; the Enquirie whereof, seemeth to me deficient.

There hath beene also laboured, and put in practise a *Method*, which is not a lawfull *Method*, but a *Method* of *Imposition*; which is to deliuer knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a shewe of Learning, who haue it not; such was the trauaile of *Raymundus Lullius*, in making that *Art*, which beares his name; not vnlike to some Bookes of *Typocrasmy*, which haue beene made since; being nothing but a Masse

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of words of all Arts; to giue men countenance, that those which vse the tearmes; might bee thought to vnderstand the Art; which Collections are much like a Frippers or Brokers shoppe; that hath ends of euerie thing, but nothing of worth.

Nowe wee descend to that part, which concerneth the ILLUSTRATION OF TRADITION, comprehended in that Science, which wee call RHETORICKE, OR ART OF ELOQUENCE; A Science excellent, and excellently welllaboured. For although in true value, it is inferiour to Wisedome, as it is sayd by God to *Moses*, when he disabled himselfe, for want of this Facultie, *Aaron shall bee thy Speaker, and thou shalt bee to him as God*: Yet with people it is the more mightie; For so *Salomon* sayth: *Sapiens Corde appellabitur Prudens, sed dulcis Eloquio Maiora reperiet*: Signifying that profoundnesse of Wisedome, will helpe a Man to a Name or Admiration; but that it is Eloquence, that preuayleth in an active life; And as to the labouring of it, the Emulation of *Aristotle*, with the *Rhetoricians* of his time, and the experience of *Cicero*, hath made them in their Workes of *Rhetorickes*, exceede themselves. Againe, the excellencie of Examples of Eloquence, in the Orations of *Demosthenes* and *Cicero*, added to the perfection of the Precepts of Eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this Arte: And therefore, the Deficiencies which I shall note, will rather bee in some Collections, which may as

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De Productione Axiomaticum.

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Hand-maydes attend the Art; than in the Rules, or use of the Art it selfe.

Notwithstanding, to stirre the Earth a little about the Rootes of this Science, as we haue done of the rest; The dutie and Office of *Rhetoricke* is, To apply Reason to Imagination, for the better moouing of the will; For wee see Reason is disturbed in the Administration thereof by three meanes; by *Illaqueation*, or *Sophisme*, which pertaines to *Logicke*; by *Imagination* or *Impression*, which pertaines to *Rhetoricke*, and by *Passion* or *Affection*, which pertaines to *Moralitie*. And as in Negotiation with others; men are wrought by cunning, by Importunitie, and by vehemencie; So in this Negotiation within our selues; men are vndermined by *Inconsequentes*, solicited and importuned, by *Impressions* or *Obuersations*: and transported by *Passions*: Neither is the Nature of Man so vnforgunately built, as that those Powers and Arts should haue force to disturbe Reason, and not to establish and aduance it: For the end of *Logicke*, is to teach a forme of Argument, to secure Reason, and not to entrappe it. The end of *Moralitie*, is to procure the Affections to obey Reason, and not to invade it. The end of *Rhetoricke*, is to fill the Imagination to second Reason, and not to oppresse it: for these abuses of Arts come in, but *Ex obliquo*, for Caution.

And therefore it was great Iniustice in *Plato*, though springing out of a iust hatred of the *Rhetoricians* of his time, to esteeme of *Rhetoricke*, but as a voluptuarie Art,

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Art, resembling it to Cookerie, that did marre wholesome Meates, and helpe vnwholesome by varietie of sawces, to the pleasure of the tast. For wee see that speech is much more conuersant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is euill: for there is no man but speaketh more honestly, than he can doe or thinke; And it was excellently noted by *Thucidides* in *Cleon*, that because he vsed to hold on the bad side in Causes of estate; therefore hee was euer inueying against Eloquence, and good speech; knowing that no man can speake faire of Courses sordide and bate. And therefore as *Plato* sayd elegantly: *That vertue, if shee could be seen, would mooue great loue and affection*: So seeing that she cannot bee shewed to the *Sence*, by corporall shape, the next degree is, to shewe her to the *Imagination* in liuely representation: for to shewe her to *Reason*, only in subtiltie of Argument, was a thing euer derided in *Chrysippus*, and many of the *Stoykes*, who thought to thrust vertue vpon men by sharpe disputations and conclusions, which haue no Sympathy with the will of Man.

Againe, if the affections in themselves were plyant and obedient to Reason, it were true, there shoulde bee no great use of perswasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and Prooves: but in regard of the continuall Mutinies and Seditious of the Affections:

Video meliora, Proboque; Deteriora sequor;
Reason would become Captiue and seruiile, if

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Eloquence

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Eloquence of Perswasions, did not practise and winne the *Imagination*, from the *affections* part, and contract a Confederacie betweene the *Reason* and *Imagination*, against the *Affections*: For the *Affections* themselves, carrie euer an appetite to good, as *Reason* doth: The difference is, *That the Affection be-holdeth meere-ly the present; Reason be-holdeth the future, and summe of time.* And therefore, the *Present*; filling the *Imagination* more; *Reason* is commonly vanquished; But after that force of *Eloquence* and *perswasion*, hath made things *future*, and *remote*, appeare as *present*, than vpon the reuolt of the *Imagination*, *Reason* preuaileth.

Wee conclude therefore, that *Rhetoricke* can bee no more charged, with the colouring of the worse part, than *Logicke* with *Sophistrie*, or *Moralitie* with *Vice*. For wee knowe the *Doctrines* of *Contraries* are the same, though the vse be opposite: It appeareth also, that *Logicke* differeth from *Rhetoricke*, not onely as the *fist*, from the *pawme*, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that *Logicke* handleth *Reason* exacte, and in truth; and *Rhetoricke* handleth it, as it is planted in popular opinions and *Manners*: And therefore *Aristotle* doth wisely place *Rhetoricke*, as betweene *Logicke* on the one side, and *Morall* or *Ciuile Knowledge* on the other, as participating of both: for the *Proofes* and *Demonstrations* of *Logicke*, are toward all men indifferent, and the same: But the *Proofes* and *perswasions* of *Rhetoricke*, ought to differ

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differ according to the *Auditors*,

Orpheus in Syluis, inter Delphinas Arion;

Which application, in perfection of *Idea*, ought to extend so farre: that if a *Man* should speake of the same thing to severall persons: he should speake to them all respectiue-ly and severall wayes: though this *Politique* part of *Eloquence* in *private* *Speech*, it is easie for the greatest *Orators* to want: whilest by the obseruing their well graced fourmes of *speech*, they leese the volubilitie of *Application*: and therefore, it shall not be amisse to recommend this to better enquire, not being curious, whether we place it heere, or in that part which concerneth *Policie*. *De prudentia sermonis priuati.*

Nowe therefore will I descend to the deficiencies, which (as I sayd) are but *Attendances*: and first, I doe not finde the *Wisedome* and *diligence* *Colores* bo- of *Aristotle* well pursued, who began to make *ni & mali*, a collection of the popular signes and colours of good simplici- and euill, both simple and comparatiue, which are & compa- as the *Sophismes* of *Rhetoricke*, (as I touched be- rati- fore.) For Example.

SOPHISMA.

Quod laudatur, bonum: Quod vituperatur, malum.

REDARGVTIO.

Laudat venales, qui vult extrudere merces.

Malum est, Malum est (inquit Emptor) sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur. The defects in the labour of *Aristotle* are three: One, that there be but a few of many: another, that their *Elenches* are not annex-

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ed; and the third, that hee conceiued but a part of the vse of them: for their vse is not onely in probation, but much more in Impression. For many fourmes are equall in *Signification*, which are differing in *Impression*: as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharpe, and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussio be the same: for there is no man, but will be a little more rayled by hearing it sayd: *Your enemies will be glad of this,*

Hor Ithacus velit, & magno mercentur Atride,
Than by hearing it sayd only, *This is euill for you.*

Secondly, I do resume also, that which I mentioned before, touching *Prowision* or *Preparatorie store*, for the Furniture of speech, and readinesse of Invention; which appeareth to be of two sorts; The one in resemblance to a shoppe of peeces vnmade vp; the other to a shopp of things ready made vp, both to be applyed to that which is frequent, and most in request; The former of these I will call *Antitheta*, & the latter *Formule*.

Antitheta are *Theses* argued, *pro* & *contra*, wherein men may be more large & laborious; but (in such as are able to doe it) to auoyd prolixity of entry, I will with the seedes of the seuerall arguments to be cast vp into some brieue and acute sentences: not to be cyted: but to be as Skaynes or Bottomes of thread, to be vnwindd at large, when they come to be vsed: supplying authorities, and Examples by reference.

Pro

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Pro verbis legis,

*Non est interpretatio, sed diuinitio, quae recedit a littera,
Cum receditur a littera Index transit in legis latorem;*

Pro sententia Legis.

*Ex omnibus verbis est Elucendus sensus, qui interpretatur
singula:*

Formulae are but decent and apt passages or conueyances of speeche, which may serue indifferently for differing subiects, as of *Preface*, *Conclusion*, *Digression*, *Transition*, *Excusation*, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and vse in the well casting of the staire cases, entrees, doores, windowes, and the like; so in speeche, the conueyances and passages are of speciall ornament and effect.

A conclusion in a Deliberatiue.

So may we redeeme the faults, passed & prevent the inconueniences future.

There remain two Appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, The one *Criticall*, The other *Pedanticall*. For all knowledge is eyther deliuered by Teachers, or attayned by mens proper endeuors: And therefore as the principall part of Tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly *writing of Bookes*; So the Relatiue part thereof concerneth *reading of Bookes* Wherunto appertayn incidently these consideratiōs. The first is concerning the true Correction & editiō of Authors, wherein neuerthelesse rash diligēce hath don gret preiudice. For these *Critiques* haue oftē presumed that that which they vnderstand not, is false set down; As the Priest, that where he found it written of *S. Paul*

Demissus est per sportam, mēded h.s book, and made it De-

missus

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missus est per portam because, *Sperita* was an hard word, and out of his reading; and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore as it hath bene wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and explication of Authors, which resteth in Annotations and Commentaries, wherein it is over vsual to blaunch the obscure places, and discourse vpon the playne.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases giue great light to true Interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some briefe Censure and iudgement of the Authors, that men therby may make some election vnto themselues, what Bookes to reade:

And the fift is concerning the Syntax and disposition of studies, that men may know in what order or pursue to reade.

For PEDANTICALL knowledge, it containeth that differēce of *Tradition* which is proper for youth: Whereunto appertaine diuers considerations of great fruit.

As first the tyming and seasoning of knowledges, as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refraine them:

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceede to the more difficult, And in what courses to presse the more difficulte and then to turne them to the more easie: for it is one

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Methodo to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dauncing with heavy shooes.

A third is the application of learning according vnto the propriety of the wittes; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectuall, but seemeth to haue a proper Cure containd in some studies; As for example, If a Child be Bird-witted, that is, hath not the facultie of attention, the Mathematiques giue a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the witte be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin. And as sciences haue a propriety towards faculties for Cure and helpe; So faculties or powers haue a Simpathy towards Sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: And therefore it is an enquiry of greate wisdom what kinds of wits and Natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.

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Fourthly the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or helpe; For as is well obserued by *Cicero*, men in exercising their faculties if they be not wel aduised doe exercise their faultes & get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a greate iudgement to be had in the continuance and intermission of Exercises. It were to longe to particularize a number of other consideratiōs of this nature, things but of meane appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants, is that, that is most important to their thriving And as it was noted, that the first six kings being in trueth as Tutors of the State of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense great-

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nesse of that state which followed: So the culture and manurance of Minds in youth, hath such a forcible (though vnseen) operacion, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can counteruaile it afterwards. And it is not amisse to obserue also, how small and meane faculties gotten by Education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, doe work great and important effects: whereof we see a notable example in *Tacitus* of two Stage-plaies, *Perennius* and *Vibulenus*, who by their facultie of playing, put the *Pannonian* armies into an extreame tumulte and combustion. For there arising a mutinie amongst them, vpon the death of *Augustus Caesar*, *Blaesus* the lieutenent had committed some of the Mutiners which were suddenly rescued: whereupon *Vibulenus* got to be heard speake, which he did in this manner, *These poore innocent wretches appointed to cruell death, you haue restored to behould the light. But who shall restore my brother to me, or life vnto my brother? that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the common Cause, and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his sencers & ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners. vpon Souldiours: Answer Blaesus, what is done with his body: The mortallest Enemies do not deny buriall: when I haue performed my last duties to the Corpes with kisses, with teares, command me to be slaine besides him, so that these my fellowes for our good meaning, and our true hearts to the Legions may haue leaue to bury vs.* With which speeche he put the army into an infinite fury and vprore, whereas truth was he had no

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brother, neyther was there any such matter, but hee plaide it meere as if he had beene vpon the stage.

But to returne, we are now come to a period of RATIONAL KNOWLEDGES, wherein if I haue made the *diuisions* other than those that are receiued, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those diuisions, which I doe not vse. For there is a double necessity imposed vpon me of altering the diuisions. The one because it differeth in end and purpose, to sorte together those things which are next in Nature, and those things which are next in vse. For if a secretary of Estate, should sort his papers, it is like in his study, or generall Cabinet, he would sort together things of a Nature, as Treaties, Instructions, &c. But in his Boxes, or particular Cabinet, hee would sort together those that he were like to vse together, though of seuerall Natures: So in this generall Cabynet of knowledge, it was necessary for me to follow the diuisions of the Nature of things, whereas if my selfe had beene to handle any particular knowledge, I would haue respected the *Diuisions fittest for vse*. The other, because the bringing in of the *Deficiencies* did by Consequence alter the *Partitions* of the rest, For let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be 15. Let the knowledge with the *Deficiencies* be 20. the parts of 15. are not the parts of 20, for the parts of 15, are 3. and 5. the parts of 20. are 2. 4. 5. and 10. So as these things are without Contradiction, and could not otherwise be.

We

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WE proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the APPETITE and WILL OF Man, whereof *Salomon sayth Ante omnia fili custodi cor tuum, nam inde procedunt actiones vite.* In the handling of this science, those which haue written seeme to me to haue done as if a man that professed to teach to write did only exhibit faire copies of *Alphabets*, & letters ioyned, without geuing any precepts or directiōs, for the cariage of the hād & framing of the letters. So haue they made good & fair Exemplars & coppies, carieng the draughts and pourtraiturs of *Good, Vertue, Duety, Felicity*, propounding the well described as the true objects and scopes of mā's wil and desires: But how to attain these excellēt marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuities, they passe it ouer altogether, or slightly and vnprofitably. For it is not the disputing. That morall vertues are in the Mindē of man by habite & not by nature: or the distinguishing. That generous spirites are wonne by doctrines and perswasions, and the vulgar sort by reward & punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches that can excuse the absence of this parte.

The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden Rocke wherevpon both this and many other barques of knowledge haue beene cast away, which is, that men haue dispised to be conuersant in ordinary and common matters, the iudicious direction whereof neuerthelesse is the wisest doctrine: (for life

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consisteth not in nouelties nor subtilities) but contrariwise they haue compounded Sciences chiefly of a certaine resplendent or lustrous masse of matter chosen to giue glory either to the subtillity of disputations or to the eloquence of discourses. But *Seneca*, giueth an excellent check to eloquence *Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit sed sui*, doctrines should be such as should make men in loue with the Lesson, and not with the Teacher, being directed to the Auditors benefite, and not to the Authors commendation: And therefore those are of the right kinde which may be concluded as *Demosthenes* concludes his counsell *Quae si feceritis non Oratorem duntaxat in praesentia laudabitis sed vosmetipsos etiā, nō ita multo post statu rerum vestrarum meliore.*

Neyther needed men of so excellent parts to haue despaired of a Fortune, (which the Poet *Virgill* promised himselfe, and indeed obtained) who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the obseruacions of husbandry, as of the heroicall acts of *Aeneas*.

Nec sum animi dubius verbis ea vincere magnum.

Quam sit & angustis his addere rebus honorem.

And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leasure that which mē may read at leasure, but really to instruct and suborne Action and actiue life, these Georgickes of the mind concerning the husbandry & tillage therof, are no lesse worthy thē the heroicall descripiōs of *vertue, duty, & felicity* wherefore the maine & primitiue diuision of *Morall* knowledge seemeth

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meth to be into the EXEMPLAR OF PLATFORME OF GOOD, and the REGIMENT OF CVLTVRE OF THE MIND; The one describing the nature of Good the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply and accomodate the will of man therevnto.

The DOCTRINE touching the PLATFORME OR NATURE OF GOOD considereth it either SIMPLE OR COMPARED, either the kindes of Good or the degrees of Good: In the later whereof those infinite disputations, which were touchiug the supreme degree thereof, which they terme Felicity, Beatitude, or the highest Good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen Diuinity, are by the christian faith discharged. And as *Aristotle* saith, *That yong men may bee happy, but not otherwise, but by Hope*; So we must all acknowledge our Minority, and embrace the felicity, which is by hope of the future world.

Freed therefore, and deliuered from this doctrine of the Philosophers heauen, whereby they fayned an higher eleuation of Mans Nature, then was; For we see in what an height of stile *Seneca* writeth, *Vere Magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei.* We may with more sobriety and truerh receiue the rest of their Enquiries, and labors? Wherein for the Nature of Good Positive, or simple, they haue set it downe excellently, in describing the fourmes of *Vertue* and *Duty*, with their situations and postures, in distributing them into their kinds, parts, Prouinces, Actions, and Administrations, and the like; Nay furder, they haue commended them to Mans Nature, and spirite with

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with greate quicknesse of Argumente, and beauty of persuasions, yea, and fortified and entrenched them (as much as discourse can doe) against corrupt and popular opinions. Againe, for the degrees, and Comparatiue Nature of Good, they haue also excellently handled it in their triplicity of Good; in the comparisons betweene a Contemplatiue and an actiue life, in the distinction between vertue with reluctance, and vertue secured; in their encounters between honesty and profit, in theyr ballancing of vertue with vertue, and the like; so as this parte deserueth to bee reported for excellently laboured.

Notwithstanding, if before they had commen to the popular and receiued Nocions of vertue and vice, pleasure and payne, and the rest, they had stayed a little longer vpon the Enquirye, concerning the Rootes of Good and euill, and the Strings of those Rootes, they had giuen in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and speciallye if they had consulted with Nature, they had made their doctrines lesse prolix, and more profound; which beeing by them in part omitted, and in part handled with much Confusion, we will endeauour to resume, and open in a more cleare Manner.

There is fourmed in euery thing a double Nature of Good; the one, as euery thing is, a Totall or substantiue in it selfe; the other, as it is a parte or Member of a greater Bodye; whereof the

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the later is in degree the greater, and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conseruation of a more generall forme. Therefore we see, the Iron in particular simpthy mooueth to the Loadstone; But yet if it exceede a cettayne quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the *Loadstone* and like a good patriot mooueth to the *Earth* which is the Region and Countrey of Massie Bodyes; so may we goe forward, and see that *Water* and *Massie bodyes* moue to the *Center of the earth* But rather thē to suffer a diuulsiō in the cōtinuāce of Nature they wil mooue vpwards from the Center of the Earth: forsaking their duty to the *Earth* in regard of their duty to the *World*. This double nature of Good & the comparatiue thereof is much more engraue vpon Man, if he degenerate not: Anto whō the Cōseruation of duty to the publique ought to be much more pecious then the Conseruation of life and being: according to that Memorable speache of *Pompeius Magnus* when being in commission of purueiance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his frinds about bim that he should uot hazard himselfe to Sea in an exrcemity of weather he sayd only to them: *Neesse est ut eam, non ut uiuam*: But it may be truly affirmed that there was neuer any phylosophy, Religion or other discipline, which did so playnly and highly exalt the good which is *Communicatiue* and depresse the good which is priuate and particuler as the Holy faith well declaring that it was the same God, that gaue the Christian Law to men, who gaue those

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those Lawes of nature, to inaminate Creatures that we spake of before; for we reade that the elected Saints of God haue wished themselues Anathemized, and razed out of the Booke of life, in an extasie of Charity, and infinite feeling of *Communion*.

This being set downe and strongly planted doth iudge and determine most of the Controuerfies wherein *Morall Philosophie* is Conuersant; For first it decideth the question touching the preferment of the Contemplatiue or actiue life, and decideth it against *Aristotle*; For all the reasōs which he bringeth for the Contemplatiue, are priuate, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a mans selfe, (in which respects no question the contemplatiue life hath the preemynence;) not much vnlike to that Comparison, which *Pythagoras* made for the gracing and Magnifying of Philosophy, and Contemplacion who being asked what he was, answered: *That if Hiero were euer at the Olympian games, he knew the Manner, that some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as Merchants to vtter their commodities, and some came to make good cheere, and meete their friends, and som came to looke on, & that he was one of them that came to look on.* But men must know, that in this Theater of Mans life, it is reserued onely for God and Angels to be lookers on, Neither could the like question euer haue beene receiued in the Church, notwithstanding their (*Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum eius*) by which place they would exalt their Ciuile death, and regular professions, but vpon this defence, that the Monasticall

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nastical life is not simple Contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or els of writing or in taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God as *Moses* did, when he abode so long in the Mount. And so wee see *Enoch* the .7. from Adam who was the first Contemplative & walked with God, yet did also endow the Church with prophesy which *Sainte Iude* citeth. But for contemplation which should be finished in it selfe without casting beames vpon society, assuredly diuinity knoweth it not.

It decideth also the controuersies betweene *Zeno* and *Socrates*, and theyr schooles and successions on the one side, who placed felicity in vertue simply or attended: the actions and exercises wherof do chiefly embrace and concerne society; & on the other side, the *Cirenaiques* & *Epicureans*, who placed it in pleasure and made vertue, (as it is vsed in some comedies of *Errors*, wherein the Mistres and the Maide change habits) to be but as a seruāt, without which, pleasure cannot be serued and attended, and the reformed schoole of the *Epicureans*, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedome from perturbation: as if they would haue deposed *Iupiter* againe, and restored *Saturne*, and the first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor Autumne, but al after one ayre and season. And *Herillus*, which placed felicity in extinguishmēt of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed Nature of Good and euill, esteeming things according to the

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cleernes of the desires, or the reluctance: which opinion was reuiued in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or wauering of beleefe, all which are manifest to tend to priuate repose & cōtentment, and not to poynt of society.

It censureth also the philosophy of *Epictetus* which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, least we be lyable to fortune & disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy to faile in good and vertuous ends for the publicke, then to obtrayne all that wee can wish to our selues in our proper fortune: as *Consaluo* sayd to his souldiers, shewing them *Naples* and protesting, he had rather dy one foote forwards, then to haue his life secured for long, by one foote of retrayt: Whereunto the wisdome of that heavenly Leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that *A good Conscience is a continuall Feaste*, shewing plainly that the conscience of good intencions howsoeuer succeeding, is a more continuall ioy to nature, then all the prouision which can be made for security and repose.

It censureth likewise that abuse of Philosophy, which grew generall about the time of *Epictetus*, in conuerting it into an occupation or profession: as if the purpose had bene, not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and auoide the causes of them, & to shape a particular kind and course of life to that end, introducing such an health of mind, as was that health of body, of which *Aristotle* speaketh of *Herodicus*, who did

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did nothing nothing all his life long, but intend his health, whereas if men refer themselves to duties of Society; as that health of Body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities, So likewise that health of Mind is most proper, which can goe through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as *Diogenes* opinion is to be accepted, who Com- mended not them which absteyned, but them which sustayned, and could refraine their Mind in *Precipitio*, and could giue vnto the mind (as is vsed in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turne.

Lastly it censureth the Tenderesse and want of application in some of the most auncient and reue- rend Philosophers and Philosophicall men, that did retyre too easily from Ciuile businesse, for auoyding of Indignities & perturbations, whereas the resolu- tion of men truly Moral, ought to be such, as the same *Consaluo* sayd, the honor of a souldior should be *Fre- la Crassiore*, and not so fine, as that euery thing should catch in it, and endanger it.

To resume *private or particular good*; it falleth into the diuision of *Good Actiue & Passiue*; For this differēce of *Good*, (not vnlike to that which amongst the Ro- māns was expressed in the familiar or household terms of *Promus*, and *Condus*;) is formed also in all things, & is best disclosed in the two seuerall Appetites in crea- tures; the one to preserue or continue themselves, & the other to dilate or Multiply themselves; whereof the later seemeth to be the worthier; For in Nature the heauens, which are the more worthy, are the *A- gen*

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gent, and the earth, which is the lesse woorthye is *the Patient*. In the pleasures of liuing creatures, that of generation is greater then that of foode. In diuine Doctrine, *Beatius est dare quam accipere*: And in life there is no mans spirit so soft but este- meth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire more then sensuality which priority of the Actiue Good, is much vpheld by the Consideration of our estate to be mortall & exposed to fortune: for, if wee mought haue a perpetuity and Certainty in our pleasures the *State* of them would advance their price. But when we see it is but *Magni estimamus Mori tardius* and *Ne glorieis de crastino. Nescis Partum diei* it maketh vs to desire to haue somewhat secured and exempted from Time, which are onely our deedes and works, as it is sayd *Opera eorum sequuntur eos*. The preheminance likewise of this actiue good is vpheld by the affection which is naturall in man towards variety and proceeding which in the pleasures of the sence which is the principal part of *Passiue* good) can haue no great latitude. *Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris Ci- bus, Somnus Ludus per hunc Circulū curritur, mori velle nō tantū fortis aut miser aut prudens sed etiā fastidiosus po- test*. But in enterprises, pursutes & purposes of life ther is much variety, wherof men are sensible with pleasure in theyr inceptions, progressions, recoyls, reintegrati- ons, approches and atteinings to their ends. So as it was wel said: *Vita sine proposito languida & vaga est*. Nei- ther hath this Actiue good and Identity with the good of Society though, in some case, it hath an in- cidence

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vidence into it: For although it do many times bring forth Acts of *Beneficēce* yet it is with a respect priuate to a mā's own power, glory, amplificatiō, cōtinuāce: as appeareth plainly when it findeth a contrary Sūbiect For that Gygātine state of mind which possesseth the trowblers of the world, such as was *Lucius Sylla* and infinit other in smaller model who would haue all mē happy or vnhappy as they were their friends or Enimies, and would giue forme to the world according to their owne humors (which is the true *Thromachy* pretendeth and aspireth to Actiue good, though it recedeth furthest from good of Society which wee haue determined to be the greater.

To resume *Passiue Good* it receiueth a subdiuision of *Conseruatiue* and *Perfēctiue*. For let vs take a brief Review of that which we haue said, we haue spoken first of the Good of Society the intention whereof embraceth the Fourm of Humaine Nature, whereof we are members & Portions: and not our owne proper and Indiuidual fourme: we haue spoken of Actiue good and supposed it as a part of Priuate and particular good. And rightly. For there is impressed vpon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from loue to themselves, one of *preseruing and contynuing* their form, another of *Advancing and Perfiting* their fourm and a third of *Multiplying* and extending their fourme vpon other things: whereof the multiplying or signature of it vpon other things, is that which we handled by the name of Actiue good. So as there remaineth the conseruing of it and parfiting or raising
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of it: which later is the highest degree of Passiue good For to preserue in state is the lesse, to preserue with advancement is the greater. So in man

Ignis est alius vigor, & celestis crigo. His approach or Assumptiō to diuine or Angellicall Nature, is the perfection of his forme, The error or false Imitatiō of which good is, that which is the tēpest of humane life while man vpon the instinct of an aduācement *Formal.* and *Essential* is carried to seek an aduancement *Locall.* For as those which are sick, & finde no remedy, doe tumble vp and downe and chaunge place, as if by a Remoue Locall, they could obtayne a Remouue Internall: So is it with men in ambition, when fayling of the meane to exalt their *Nature*, they are in a perpetuall estuation to exalte their *Place*. So then *passiue Good*, is, as was sayde, eyther *Conseruatiue* or *Perfēctiue*.

To resume the good of *conseruation* or *Comforte*, which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our *Natures*, it seemeth to be the most pure and Naturall of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this also receiueth a differēce, which hath neither bene well iudged of, nor well inquired. For the good of fruition or contentment, is placed eyther in the *Sincerensse* of the fruition, or in the *quicknesse* & *vigor* of it, the one superinduced by the *Equality*, the other by *Vicissitude*: the one hauing lesse mixture of *Euil*, the other more impressiō of *Good*. Whether of these, is the greter good, is a questiō cōtrouerted, but whether

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maus nature may not be capable of both, is a question not inquired.

The former question heing debated between *Socrates*, and a *Sophist*, *Socrates* placing felicity in an equall and constant peace of mind; and the *Sophist* in much desiring, and much enjoying: they fell from Argument to ill words: The *Sophist* saying that *Socrates* felicity, was the felicity of a block or stone, and *Socrates* saying that the *Sophists* felicity, was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itche and scratch. And both these opinions, do not want their supports. For the opinion of *Socrates* is much upheld by the generall consent, euen of the *Epicures* themselves, that vertue beareth a great part in felicity: and if so, certain it is, that vertue hath more vse in clearing perturbations, then in compassing desires. The *Sophists* opinion is much faouored, by the Assertion we last spake of, that *good of Advancement*, is greater then *good of simple Preservation*: because, euery obtaining a desire, hath a shew of advancement, as motion though in a Circle, hath a shew of progression.

But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former superfluous. For, can it be doubted, but that there are some, who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures, then some other; and yet nevertheless, are lesse troubled with the losse or leauing of them: So as this same; *Non uti, ut non appetas: Non appetere, ut non metuas, sunt animi pusilli & diffidentis*. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the *Philosophers* are more fearefull and cautionary then

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then the Nature of things requireth. So haue they encreased the feare of death, in offering to cure it. For, when they would haue a mans whole life, to be but a discipline or preparation to dye: they must needs make men thinke, that it is a terrible Enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the Poet,

*Qui finem vita extremum inter Munera ponat
Natura:*

So haue they fought to make mens minds to vniforme and harmonically, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary Motions: the reason whereof, I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated, to a priuate, free, and vnappplied course of life. For, as we see, vpon the lute, or like Instrument, a *Ground*, though it be sweet, and haue shew of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stoppes and passages, as a *Set song*, or *Voluntary*: much after the same Manner was the diuersity betweene a *Philosophicall* and a *ciuile* life. And therefore men are to Imitate the wisdome of *Jewellers*, who, if there be a graine, or a cloude, or an ise which may be ground forth, without taking to much of the stone, they help it: but, if it should lessen and abate the stone to much they will not meddle with it: So ought men, so to procure *Serenity*, as they destroy not magnanimity.

Having therefore deduced the *Good of Man*, which is *private & particular*, as far as seemeth fit: wee will now returne to that *Good of man*, which respecteth and be

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beholdeth Society which we may terme Duty; because the term of duty is more proper to a minde well framed & disposed towards others, as the terme of vertue is applyed to a mind well formed & composed in it selfe, though neither can a man vnderstand vertue without some relation to Society, nor duty without an inwarde disposition, This part may seem at first to pertaine to Science Ciuile and Politicke: but not if it be wel obserued, For it concerneth the Regimēt & gouernment of euery man, over himself, & not ouer others. And as in architectur, the directiō of framing the postes beames & other parts of building is not the same with the maner of ioyning them and erecting the building: And in mechanicalls, the direction how to frame an Instrument or Engyne, is not the same with the maner of setting it on worke and imploying it: and yet neuerthelesse in expressing of the one, you incidently expresse the Aptnesse towards the other: So the doctrine of Coniugation of men in Socyety, differereth from that of their conformity therevnto.

This part of Duty is sudiuided into two parts: the common duty of euery man, as a Man or member of a State: The other the respectiue or speciall duty of euery man in his profession vocation and place: The first of these, is extāt & wel laboured as hath been said. The secōd like wise I may report rather dispersed thē deficient: which maner of dispersed writing in this kind of Argumēt, I acknowledge to be best. For who cā take vpō him to write of the proper duty, vertue challenge and

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and right, of euery seuerall vocation profession, and place. For although sometimes a Looker on may see more then a gamester and there be a Prouerb more arrogant then sound *That the vale best discovereth the hill*: yet there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really & materialy in their owne professions: & that the writing of speculatiue men of Actiue Matter, for the most part doth seeme to men of Experience as Phormios Argument of the warrs seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreames and dotage. Onely there is one vice which accompanieth them, that write in their own professions that they magnify thē in excesse, But generally it were to be wished, (as that which wold make learning indeed solide & fruitful) that Actiue men woold or could become writers

In which kind I cannot but mencion *Honoris causa* your Maiesties excellent booke touching the duty of a king: a worke ritchlye compounded of *Diuinity Morality and Policy*, with great aspersiō of all other artes: & being in myne opinion one of the moste sound & healthful writings that I haue read: not distempred in the heat of inuention nor in the Couldnes of negligence: not sick of *Dusinesse* as those are who leese themselves in their order; nor of *Convulsions* as those which Crampe in matters impertinent: not fauoring of perfumes & paintings as those doe who seek to please the Reader more then Nature beareth, and chiefelye wel disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth, and apt for action: and farre remooued from that Naturall infir.

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infirmity, whereunto I noted those, that write in their own professions to be subiect, which is, that they exalt it aboue measure. For your Maiesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria, or Persia, in their extern glory: but a *Moses*, or a *Dauid*, Pastors of their people. Neither can I euer leese out of my remembraunce, what I heard your Maiesty, in the same sacred spirite of Government, deliuer, in a great cause of Iudicature which was: *That Kings ruled by theyr lawes, as God did by the lawes of Nature, and ought as rarely to put in use theyr Supreme Prerogative, as God doth his power of working Miracles.* Aud yet notwithstanding, in your book of a free Monarchy, you do well giue men to vnderstand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a King, as well as the Circle of his office and duty. Thus haue I presumed to alledge this excellent writing of your Maiesty, as a prime or eminent example of *Tractates*, concerning speciall & respectiue duties: wherein I should haue said as much, if it had beene written a thousand yeares since: Neither am I moued with certain Courtly decencies, which esteeme it flattery to prayse in presence. No, it is flattery to prayse in absence: that is, when eyther the vertue is absent, or the occasion is absent: and so the prayse is not Naturall, but forced, either in truth, or in time. But let *Cicero* be read in his *Oration pro Marcello*, which is nothing but an excellent Table of *Cesar's* vertue, and made to his face, besides the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a great deale then such obseruers: and we will neuer doubt, vpon a full occasion, to giue iust praises

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praises to present or absent.

But to return, there belongeth further, to the handling of this partie touching the duties of professions and vocations a *Relative or opposite* touching the fraudes cautels, impostures, & vices of euery profession, which hath been likewise handled. But howe? rather in a Satyre & Cinicaly, then seriously & wisely for men haue rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions then with Iudgement to discouer and seuer that which is corrupt. For as *Salomon* saith. He that cometh to seeke after knowledg with a mind to scorne and censure, shalbe sure to finde matter for his humor but no matter for his Instruction. *Quarenti derisori Scientiam, ipsa se abscondit: sed Studioso fit obuiam.* But the managing of this argument with integrity & Truthe, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and vertue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the *Basilisk*, that if he see you first you die for it: but if you see him first, he dieth So is it with deceits and euill arts: which if they be first espied they leese their life, but if they prevent they indanger. So that we are much beholden to *Macciauell* & others that write what men doe and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to ioyne serpentine wisdom with the Columbine Innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the *Serpent*: his basenesse and going vpon his bellye, his volubility and lubricity his enuy and sting, and the rest, that is all fourmes and Natures of euill. For
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without this vertue lyeth open and vnfenced. Nay an honest man can doe no good vppon those that are wicked to reclaim them, without the helpe of the knowledge of evil. For mē of corrupted minds presuppose, that honesty groweth out of Simplicity of manners, and beleuing of Preachers, schoolmasters, and Mens exterior language. So as, except you can make them perceiue, that you know the vtmost reaches of theyre owne corrupt opinions, they despise all moralitye. *Non recipit stultus verba prudentia, nisi ea dixeris, qua versantur in Corde eius.*

Vnto this part touching *Respectiue duty*, doth also appertayne the dutyes betweene husband and wife, parent and childe, Master and Seruant: So likewise, the lawes of friendship and Gratitude, the ciuile bond of Companies, Colledges, and Politike bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties: not as they ar parts of Gouvernment and Society, but as to the framing of the minde of particular persons.

The knowledge concerning *good respecting Society* doth handle it also not *simply* alone but *Comparatiuely* whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties, betwen person and person, Case and Case, particular & publike: As we see in the proceeding of *Lucius Brutus*, against his own Sons, which was so much extolled: yet what was sayd?

Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata Minores.

So the case was doubtfull, and had opinion

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on both sides: Againe we see, when *M. Brutus* and *Cassius* inuited to a supper certaine, whose opinions they meant to feele, whether they were fit to be made their Associates, and cast foorth the question touching the *Killing of a Tyrāt* being an vsurper they wer deuided in opinion, some holding, that Seruitude was the Extreame of Euils; and others, that Tyranny was better, then a Ciuile war: and a number of the like cases there are, of cōparatiue duty. Amōgst which, that of all others, is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deale of good to ensue of a small Iniustice. Which *Iason of Thessalia* determined against the truth; *Aliqua sunt iniuste facienda, vt multa iuste fieri possint.* But the reply is good; *Authorem presentis Iustitiae habes sponsores futuræ non habes;* Men must pursue things which are iust in presente, and leaue the future to the diuine prouidence: So then we passe on from this generall part touching the Exemplar and description of Good.

Now therefore, that we haue spoken of this fruite of life, it remaineth to speake of the Husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without which part, the former seemeth to be no better then a faire Image, or *statua, tura,* which is beautifull to contemplate, but is without life and mocion: whereunto *Aristotle* himselfe subscribeth in these words: *Neesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, & quid sit, & ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit, virtutem quidem nosse, acquirenda autem eius modos & vias ignorare Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quaerendum est, sed & quomodo sui copiam faciat, virumque e-*

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nam volumus, et rem ipsam nosse & eius compotes fieri: Hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus & ex quibus & quo modo. In such full wordes and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part: So saith Cicero in great Commendation of Cato the second, that he he had applyed himself to Philosophy. *Non ita disputandi causa, sed ita viuendi.* And although the neglect of our tymes wherein few men doe houlde any Consultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca excellently saith, *De partibus vite quisque deliberat, de summa nemo*) may make this part seem superfluous: yet I must Conclude with that *Aphorism of Hypocrates, Qui graui morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, ips mens egrotat.* They neede medicine not onely to asswage the disease but to awake the sense And if it be saide, that the cure of mens Mindes belongeth to sacred diuinity, it is most true: But yet Morall Philosophy may be preferred vnto her as a wise seruaunt, and humble handmaide. For as the Psalme saith, *That the eyes of the handmayde looke perpetually towards the mistresse,* and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmayde, to disceine of the mistresse will: So ought Morall Philosophy to giue a constant attention to the doctrines of Diuinity, and yet so as it may yeeld of her selfe (within due limits) Many sound and profitable directions.

This Part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange, that it is not reduced to written enquiry, the rather because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and acti-

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on is often conuersant, and such wherein the common talke of men (which is rare, but yet commeth sometimes to passe) is wiser then their Bookes: It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the woorthinesse, and because we may acquite our selues for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceiued and presupposed by those themselves, that haue written. We wil therefore enumerate some heads or Points thereof, that it may appeare the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

First therefore in this, as in all things, which are practical, we ought to cast vp our account, what is in our power, and what not: for the one may be dealt with by waye of alteration, but the other by waye of application onely. The husbandman cannot command, neither the Nature of the Earth, nor the seasons of the weather: no more can the Physition the constitution of the patiente, nor the variety of Accidentes. So in the Culture and Cure of the mynde of Man, two things are without our commaund: Poyntes of Nature, and pointes of Fortune. For to the Basis of the one, and the Conditions of the other, our worke is limited and tied. In these things therefore, it is left vnto vs, to proceede by application, *Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo*: and so likewise *vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo*. But, when that wee speake of sufferinge, wee doe not speake of a dull, and neglected sufferinge, but of a wise and industrious sufferinge, which draweth,

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and contriueth vse and aduantage out of that which seemeth aduerse and contrary; which is that property which we call, Accomodating or Applying. Now the wisdom of Application resteth principally in the exact & distinct knowledge of the precedent state, or disposition, vnto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a garment, except wee first take measure of the Body.

So then the first Article of this knowlede is to set downe Sound and true distributions and descriptions of the seuerall characters & tempers of mens Natures and dispositions specially hauing regard to those differences which are most radical in being the fountayns and Causes of the rest or most frequent in Concurrence or Commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage the better to describe the Mediocrities of vertues that can satisfie this intention for if it deserue to be considered *That there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, & others to smal,* (Which Aristotle handleth or ought to haue handled by the name of Magnanimity) doth it not deserue as well to be Considered. *That there are mindes proportioned to intend many matters and others to few?* So that some can deuide them selues others can perchance do exactly wel, but it must bee but in fewe things at once; And so there cometh to bee a *Narrownes of mind* as wel as a *Pusillanimity*. And againe, *That some mindes are proportioned to that which may bee dispatched at once or within a short return of time: others to that which begins a farre off, and is to be won with length of*
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pursute, — Iam tū tenditque fouetque; So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity which is Comonly also ascribed to God as a *Magnanimity* So further deserued it to be considered, by Aristotle *That there is a disposition in Conuersation* (supposing it in things which doe in no sort touch or concerne a mans selfe) to soothe and please; And a disposition contrary to Contradict and Crosse; And deserueth it not much better to be considered, *That there is a disposition, not in conuersation or talke, but in matter of more serious Nature* (and supposing it still in things meerly indifferent) to take pleasure in the good of another, and a disposition contrarywise, to take distast at the good of another; which is that properly, which we call good Nature, or ill Nature, benignity or Malignity: And therefore I cannot sufficiently Maruayle, that this parte of knowledge touching the seuerall Characters of Natures and dispositions should bee omitted both in Morality and policy, considering it is of so great Ministry, and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of Astrology, somprety and apt diuisions of mens Natures according to the predominances of the Planets; *Louers of Quiet Louers of action, louers of victory, louers of Honour, louers of pleasure, louers of Arts, louers of Change,* and so forth: A man shall find in the wisest sort of these Relations, which the Italians make touching *Conclaves*, the Natures of the seuerall Cardinals, handsomlye and liuely painted fourth: A man shall meete with in euery dayes Conference the denominations of *Sensitive, dry, formall, reall, humorous, certayne, Humo di Prima impressione, Huomo di vltima impressione,* and the like,
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and yet neuerthelesse this kind of obseruations wandreth in wordes, but as not fixed in Enquiry. For the distinctions are found (many of them) but we conclude no precepts vpon them, wherein our faulte is the greater, because both History, Poesye, and daylie experience are as goodly fields where these obseruations grow, whereof wee make a few poesies, to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that Receits mought be made of them for vse of life.

Of much like kinde are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed vpon the Mind by the Sex, by the Age, by the Region, by health, and sicknesse, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent, and not externe: and again those which are caused by extern fortune: as Soueraynty, Nobility, obscure birth, ritches, want, Magistracye, priuatenesse, prosperity, aduersity, Constant fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like: And therefore we see, that *Plautus* maketh it a wonder, to see an oulde man beneficent; *Benignitas huius ut adolescentuli est*: *Saint Paul* concludeth that seuerity of discipline was to be vsed to the Cretans, *Increpa eos dure*, vpon the disposition of their Country *Cretenses semper mendaces, mala Bestia, ventres pigri*. *Salust* noteth, that it is vsuall with Kinges to desire Contradictories, *sed plerunque Regia voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, saepeque ipsa sibi aduersa*. *Tacitus* obserueth

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serueth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition, *solus Vespasianus, mutatus in melius*, *Pindarus* maketh an obseruation, that greate and suddaine fortune for the most parte defeateth men *Qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt*: So the Psalme sheweth it is more easie to keep a measure in the enioying of fortune, then in the increase of fortune. *Diuitie si affluant, nolite Cor apponere*: These obseruations and the like, I denye not, but are touched a little by *Aristotle* as in passage in his Rhetoricks, and are handled in some scattered discourses, but they were neuer incorporate into Morall Philosophy, to which they doe essentiallye appertayne: as the knowledg of the diuersitye of groundes and Mouldes doth to Agriculture, and the knowledg of the diuersity of Complexions and Constitutions doth to the Phisition; except we meane to follow the indiscretion of *Empiriques*, which minister the same medicines to all patients.

Another Article of this knowledge is the Inquirye touching the affections: for as in Medicining of the body it is in order first to know the diuers Complexions and constitutions, secondlye the diseases, and lastlye the Cures: So in medicining of the Minde, after knowledg of the diuers Characters of mens natures, it foloweth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other then the perturbations & distempers of the affections.

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tions. For as the aunciente in politiques in popular Estates were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the Orator to the winds because as the sea would of it selfe be calme and quiet, if the windes did not moove and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation. So it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections as winds, did not put it into tumulte and perturbation. And here againe I finde strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written diuers volumes of Ethiques, and neuer handled the affections, which is the principall subiect thereof, and yet in his Retoricks where they are considered but collaterally, & in a second degree, (as they may be mooued by speech) he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity but where their true place is, he pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and paine that can satisfie this inquiry, no more then hee that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of Colours: for pleasure and paine are to the particuler affections as light is to particular collours: Better trauailes I suppose had the Stoicks taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which wee haue at second hand: But yet it is like, it was after their manner rather in subtiltye of definitions (which in a subiect of this nature are but curiosities) then in actiue and ample descriptions and obseruations: so likewise I finde some particular

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writings of an elegant nature touching some of the affections, as of Anger, of Comforte upon aduerse accidentes, of Tendernesse of Countenance and other. But the poets and writers of Histories are the best Doctors of this knowledge, where we may finde painted fourth with greate life, How affections are kindled and incyted: and how pacified and restrained: and how againe Conteyned from Act, & further degree: how they disclose themselues, how they work how they varye, how they gather and fortifie, how they are inwrapped one within another, and how they doe fighte and encounter one with another, and other the like particularities: Amongst the which this last is of speciall vse in Morall and Ciuile matters: howe I say to sett affection against affection, and to Master one by another, even as wee vse to hunt beast with beast, and flye byrde with birde, which otherwise percase wee coulde not so easily recover: vpon which foundation is erected that excellent vse of *Premium* and *pæna*. whereby Ciuile states Consist, imploying the predominante affections of feare and hope, for the suppressing and brideling the rest. For as in the gouernemente of states, it is sometimes necessarye to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the gouernemente within.

Now Come we to those poynts which are within our our owne comand and haue force and operacion vpon the mind to affect the wil & Appetite & to alter Manners: wherein they ought to haue handled *Custom*

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Exercise, Habit, Educacion, example, Imitation, Emulation, Company, Frinds, praise, Reproofe, exhortatiō, fame, lawes, Bookes, studyes: theis as they haue determinate vse, in moralities, from these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts & Regiments compounded & described, as may seeme to recouer or preferue the health and Good estate of the mind, as farre as pertaineth to humane Medycine: of which number wee will visit vpon som one or two as an exāple of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and therefore wee doe resume Custom and habite to speake of.

The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to mee a negligent opinion. That of those thinges which consist by nature, nothing can be changed by custome, vsing for example: That if a stone bee throwne ten thousand tymes. vp, it wil not learne to assend, and and that by, often seeing or hearing, wee doe not learne to see or heare the better. For though this principle bee true in things wherein nature is *Peremptory* (the reason whereof we cannot nowe stande to discusse) yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a *latitude*. For he mought see that a streight gloue wil come more easily on with vse, and that a wand will by vse bend otherwise then it grewe: and that by vse of the voice wee speake lowder and stronger, and that by vse of enduring heate or coulde, we endure it the better, and the like: which later sort haue a neerer resemblance vnto that subiect of Manners he handleth then those instances which he alledgeth; But allowing
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his Conclusion that *vertues and vices consist in habit*, he ought so much the more to haue taught the manner of superinducing that habite: for there bee many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the minde, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, wherof we wil recite a fewe.

The first shal bee, that wee beware wee take not at the first either to *Hig* a strayne or to *weake*: for if, too *Highe* in a differēt nature you discourage, in a confident nature, you breede an opinion of facility, and so a sloth, and in all natures you breede a furder expectation then can hold out, and so an *infatisfaction* on the end, if to weake of the ether side: you may not looke to performe and ouercome any great taske.

Another precept is to practise all thinges chiefly at two seuerall times, the one when the mind is beste disposed, the other when it is *worste disposed*: that by the one you may gaine a great step, by the other you may worke out the knots and *Stondes* of the mind, and make the middle times the more easily and pleasant.

Another precept is, that which Aristotle mencioneth by the way, which is to beare euer towards the *Contrary* extreame of that whereto we are by Nature inclyned: like vnto the Rowing against the stream or making a wand straight by bynding him *Contrary* to his natural Crookednesse.

Another precept is, that the mind is brought to any thing better and with more sweetnesse and happinesse, if that whereto you pretend be not first in the

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intention. but *Tanquā aliud agendo*, because of the Naturall hatred of the minde against necessity and Constraint. Many other Axiomes there are touching the Managing of *Exercise* and *custome*: which being so Conducted, doth prooue indeed another nature: but being governed by chance, doth cōmōly prooue but an ape of nature, & bringeth forth that which is lame and Counterfette.

So if wee shoulde handle *bookes* and *studies* and what influence and operation they haue vpon manners, are there not diuers precepts of greate caution and direction appertaining thereunto? did not one of the fathers in greate indignation call *Poesy vinum Demonum*, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations and vaine opinions? Is not the opinion of *Aristotle* worthy to be regarded wherein he saith, That youg men are no fitte auditors of Morai Philosophy, because they are not settled from the boyling heate of their affections, nor attempered with *Time* and experience? and doth it not hereof come that those excellent books and discourses of the aunciente writers, (whereby they haue perswaded vnto *vertue* most effectually, by representing her in *State* and *Majesty*; and *populer opinions* against *vertue* in their *Parasites Coates*, fitt to be scorned and derided,) are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not red & reuolued by mē in their mature and settled yeares, but confined almost to boyes & beginners? but is it not true also that much lesse, young men are fit auditors of *Matters of Policy*, till they haue beene
throughly

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throughly seasoned in religion & Morality, least their Iudgements be corrupted, and made apt to thinke that there are no true Differences of things, but according to *utility* and *fortune*, as the verse describes it. *Prosperum et Felix scelus virtus vocatur*: And Againe *Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, Hic diadema*: which the Poets do speak satyrically and in indignation on vertues behalte: But books of pollicie doe speake it seriously, and positiuely, for so it pleaseth *Machianell* to say *That if Caesar had bene ouerthrowne, he woulde haue bene more odious then euer was Catiline*; as if there had bene noe difference but in fortune, between a *very fury of lust & bloud*, and the most excellent spirit (his ambiciō reserued) of the world? Again is there not a Caution likewise to be giuen of the doctrines of Moralities thēselues (some kindes of thē) leaste they make men too precise, arrogāt, incōpatible, as *Cicero* saith of *Cato in Marco Catone*. *Hæc bona quæ videmus diuina & egregia ipsius scitote esse propria: quæ nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia, non a natura sed a Magistro*? Many other Axiomes & aduises there are touching those proprieties & effects, which studies doe infuse & instil into maners: And so likewise is there touchinge the vse of all those other points of Company: fame, lawes and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of Morality.

But there is a kind of *CULTURE* of the MIND; that femeth yet more accurate & elaborate thē the rest & is built vpon this ground: That the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfite, and at o-
ther

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other tymes in a state more depraved. The purpose therefore of this practise is to fixe and cherishe the good howers of the mind and to obliterate and take fourth the Euil: The fixing of the good hath bene practised by two meanes, vovues or Constant resolutions, and obseruances, or exercises which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keepe the mynd in continual obedience. The obliteration of the Euill hath been practised by two Meanes, some kind of Redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an Inception or account *de Nouo*, for the time to come: but this part, seemeth sacred and religious, and Iustly: for all good Morall Philosophy (as was said,) is but an handmaide to Religion.

Wherefore we will conclude with that last pointe which is of all other meanes the moste compendious and summarie, and againe, the moste noble and effectual to the reducing of the minde vnto vertue and good estate: which is the electing and propounding vnto a mans selfe good & vertuous ends of his life, such as may bee in a reasonable sorte within his Compas to attaine. For if these two things be supposed: that a mā set before him honest & Good ends, and againe that he bee resolute, Constant, and true vnto them; it will follow that hee shall Moulde himselfe into al vertue at once: and this is indeede like the worke of nature, whereas the other course, is like the worke of the hand. For as when a caruer makes an image, hee shapeth onely that parte whereupon hee worketh, as if hee bee vpon *The face* that parte which shall

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shal bee *the body* is but a rude stone stil, til such times as hee comes to it. But contrarywise when Nature makes a *flower* or *living creature*, shee fourtheth rudiments of all the parts at one time; so in obtaining vertue by *habite*, while a man practiseth Temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like; But when he dedicateth & applyeth himselfe to *good ends*, loke what vertue soeuer the pursute and passage towards those ends doth commend vnto him, he is inuested of a precedent disposition to conforme himselfe thereunto: which state of mind *Aristotle* doth excellently expresse himself, that it ought not to be called *vertuous*, but *Diuine*: his words are these; *Immanitati autem consentaneum est, opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, heroicā sive diuinam virtutem.* And a little after; *Nā ut fera, neque vitiū, neq; virtus est sic neq; Dei. Sed hic quidē status altius quiddā virtute est, ille aliud quiddā a vitio.* And therefore we may see what Celstitude of honor *Pinius secundus* attributeth to *Traiane* in his funerall oration, where he said. *That men needed to make noe other praiers to the Gods, but that they would continue as good Lords to them, as Traiane had bene:* as if he had not bene onely an Imitation of diuine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen & prophane passages having but a shadowe of that diuine state of mind, which Religion and the holy faith doth conduct men vnto; by imprinting vpon their soules *Charity* which is excellently called the bond of *Perfection*: because it cōprehēdeth & fastneth al vertues together. And it is elegantly said by *Menander* of vaine loue which

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which is but a false Imitation of diuine loue. *Amor melior Sophista, Lauo ad humanam vitam*, that Loue teacheth a man to Carry himselfe better, then the *Sophist* or *Præceptor*, which he calleth *Left handed*, because with all his rules & preceptiõs he cannot form a man so *Dexteriously*, nor with that facility to prize himself & gouern himself as loue cã do: So certainly if a mãs mind be truly inflamd with charity it doth work him sodainly into greter perfectiõ then al the Doctrin of moralitie can doe, which is but a *sophist* in comparison of the other. Nay further as *Xenophon* obserued truely that all other affections though they raise the minde, yet they doe it by distorting, and vncomlineesse of extasies or excesses; but onely Loue doth exalt the mind, and neuerthelesse; at the same instant doth settle and *Compose* it, so in all other excellencies though they aduance nature yet they are subiect to Excesse. Onely Charity admitteth noe Excesse; for soe we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the Angells transgressed and fel: *Ascendam, & ero similis altissimo*: By aspiring to be like God in knowledge man transgressed and fell. *Eritis sicut Dii scientes bonum & malum*; But by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodnesse or loue, neyther Man nor Angell euer transgressed or shall transgresse. For vnto that imitation wee are called, *Diligite inimicos vestros, Benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, & orate pro persecuentibus & Calumniantibus vos ut sitis filii patris vestri qui in caelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos*

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bonos & malos, & pluit super iustos & iniustos. So in the first platfourme of the diuine Nature it self, the heathē Religion speaketh thus, *Optimus Maximus*, and the sacred scriptures thus, *Misericordia eius super omnia opera eius*.

Wherefore I doe conclude this part of Morall knowledge concerning *the Culture and Regiment of the Mind*, wherein if any man considering the parts thereof, which I haue enumerated, doe iudge, that my labor is but to Collect into an *Art* or *Sciēce*, that which hath bin pretermitted by others, as matter of cõmon Sence, and experience, he iudgeth well: But as *Philocrates* sported with *Demosthenes*: *you may not maruaile (Athenians) that Demosthenes and I doe differ, for he drinketh water, and I drinke wine*: and like as wee reade of an aunciente parable of *the two gates of sleep*.

*Sunt geminae somni porta, quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera Candenti perfecta nitens Elephanto,
Sed falsa ad caelum mittunt insomnia manes.*

So if wee put on sobriety and attention, we shall finde it a sure Maxime in knowledge: that the more pleasaunte Liquor (of Wine) is the more vaporous, and the brauer gate of *Iuorje*, sendeth foorth the falser dreames.

But we haue now concluded, *That generall part of Humane Philosophie, which contemplateth man segregate, and as hee consisteth of bodye and spirite*; Wherein wee maye further note, that there

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there seemeth to be a Relatiō or Conformity between the good of the mynd, and the good of the Body. For as we deviced the good of the body into *Health, Beauty, strength, and Pleasure*, so the good of the mynde inquired in Rationall and Morall knowledges tendeth to this, to make the minde sound, and without perturbation, *Beautifull* and graced with decencie: and *Strong* and *Agill* for all duties of life. Theis three as in the bodye, so in the minde seeldome meete, and Commonly seuer: For it is easlye to obserue, that many haue Strength of witte and Courage, but haue neither Healthe from perturbations, nor any Beauty or decencie in their doings: som againe haue an Elegancy and finenesse of Carriage, which haue neither soundnesse of honestie, nor substance of sufficiencie: And some againe haue honest and reformed Myndes that can neither become themselves nor Manage Businesse, and sometimes two of them meete, and rarely all three: As for pleasure, wee haue likewise determined, that the minde oughte not to bee reduced to stypide, but to retayne pleasure: Confined rather in the subiect of it, then in the strength and vigor of it.

CIVILE KNOWLEDGE is conversant about a subiect which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to Actiome. Neuerthelesse

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Neuerthelesse, as *Cato* the Cenfor saide, *That the Romane: were like sheepe, for that a man were better drive a flock of them, then one of them; For in a flocke, if you could ge. but some fewe goe righte, the rest would follow:* So in that respect Morall philosophie is more difficile then Pollicie. Againe, morall Philosophie propoundeth to it selfe the framing of Internall goodnesse: But ciuile knowledge requireth onelye an Externall goodnesse: for that as to societie sufficeth: And therefore it cometh oft to passe that there be Euill Times in good governments: for so we finde in the holy story when the kings were good, yet it is added. *Sed adhuc populus non dixerat cor suum ad dominum Deum patrum suorum.* Againe States as great Engines mooue slowly, and are not so soone put out of frame: for as in *Egypt* the seauē good years sustained the seauen badde: So governments for a time well grounded doe beare out errors following. But the resolution of particuler persons is more sodainly subverted, These respects doe somewhat qualifie the extreame difficulty of ciuile knowledge.

This knowledge hath three parts according to the three summary Actiōs of societie, which are, *Cōversation, Negotiatiō* and *Gouernment*. For mā seeketh in societie comfort, vse and Protection: & they be three wisēdōs of diuers natures, which do oftē seuer: wisēdome of the behauiour, wisēdome of Businesse; & wisēdome of *state*.

The wisēdome of of conuersation ought not to be ouer much affected, bnt much lesse despised: for it

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hath not onely an honour in it selfe, but an influence also into businesse and government; The poet saith.

Nec vultu destruit verba tuo. A man maie destroy the force of his woords with his countenance: so may he of his deeds saith *Cicero*, recommending to his brother affability and easy accessse, *Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum.*

It is nothing wonne to admitte men with an open doore, and to receiue them with a shutte and reserued countenance. So wee see *Atticus*, before the first interuiwe betweene *Cæsar* and *Cicero*, the warre depending, did seriouslye aduise *Cicero* touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the gouernement of the countenance bee of such effecte, much more is that of the speeche, and other carriage appertayning to conuersation; the true modele whereof seemeth to mee well expressed by *Livy*, though not meante for this purpose; *Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius, quorum alterum est alienæ libertatis oblitus, alterum suæ: The summe of behauioure is to retayne a mans owne dignitie, without intruding vpon the libertie of others: on the other side, if behauioure and outwarde carriage bee intended too much, first it may passe into affection, and then *Quid deformius quam Scenam in vitam transferre*, to acte a mans life? But although it proceede not to that extreame, yet it consumeth time, and imployeth*

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eth the minde too much. And therefore as wee vlt to aduise younge studentes from company keeping, by saying, *Amici, surs Temporis*: So certainly the Intending of the discretion of behauioure is a great Theefe of Meditation: Againe, such as are accomplished in that howr of vrbanity, please themselves in name, and sildome aspire to higher vertue: whereas those that haue defect in it, do seeke *Comlines* by Reputation: for where reputacion is, almost euery thing becommeth: But where that is not, it must be supplied by *Puntos* and *Complementes*: Agayne, there is no greater impediment of Action, then an ouercurious obseruance of decency, and the guide of decencye, which is Tyme and season. For as *Salomon* sayeth, *Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat, & qui respicit ad nubes, non metet*: A man must make his opportunity, as ofte as finde it. To conclude; Behauiour seemeth to me as a Garment of the Minde, and to haue the Condicions of a Garmente. For it ought to bee made in fashion: it ought not to bee too curious: It ought to bee shaped so, as to sette foorth anye good making of the minde: and hide any deformity; and aboue all, it ought not to be too straighte, or restrayned for exercise or mocion. But this parte of Ciuile knowledge hath bene elegantlye handled, and therefore I cannot reporte it for deficient.

The wisdome touching Negotiation or businesse hath

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hath not bin hitherto collected into writing to the great derogacion of learning, and the professors of learninge. For from this roote springeth chiefly that note or opinion which by vs is expressed in A. dage, to this effecte: That there is noe greate concurrence betweene learning and Wisedome. For of the three wisdomes which wee haue sette downe to pertaine to ciuil life, for wisdome of Behaviour, it is by learned men for the moste parte despised, as an Inferiour to Vertue and an Enemy to Meditation; for wisdome of Gouvernente they acquite themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to fewe. But for the wisdome of Businesse wherein mans life is moste conuersant, there bee noe Bookes of it, excepte some fewe scattered aduertisementes, that haue noe proportion to the magnitude of this subiecte. For if bookes were written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men with meane experience, woulde farre excell men of longe experience withoute learning, and outshoote them in their owne bowe.

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowlledge shoulde bee so variable as it falleth not vnder precept; for it is much lesse infinite then science of Gouvernente, which wee see is laboured and in some parte reduced. Of this wisdome it seemeth some of the auncient Romanes in the saddest and wisest times were professors: for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in vse. For Senators that had

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name and opinion, for generallwise men as *Cornelianus, Curius, Lelius* and manie others; to walke at certaine howers in the *Place*, and to giue audience to those that would vse their aduise, and that the particuler Citizens would resort vnto them, and consulte with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the imploying of a sonne, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusatiō and euery other occasion incident to mans life; so as there is a wisdome of Counsaile and aduise euen in priuate Causes: arising out of an vniuersall insight into the affayrs of the world, which is vsed indeede vpon particuler cases propouēd but is gathered by generall obseruation of causes of like nature. For so wee see in the Booke which Cicero writeth to his brother *De petitione consultatus*, (being the onely booke of businesse that I know written by the auncients) although it concerned a particuler action then on foote, yet the substance thereof consisteth of manie wise and politique Axioms which containe not a temporary, but a perpetuall direction in the case of popular Elections; but chiefly wee may see in those Aphorismes which haue place amongst Divine writings composed by Salomon the King, of whom the scriptures testifie that his hearte was as the sandes of the sea, incompassing the world and all worldly matters we see I saie, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions; wherevpon wee will staie a while offering

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offering to consideracion some number of Exam-
ples.

*Sed & cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur, ne accom-
modes aurem tuam, ne forte audias seruum tuum male-
dicentem tibi.* Heere is concluded the prouidente
staye of enquiry, of that which we wolde be loathe
to finde: as it was iudged greate wisdom in *Pom-
peius Magnus* that he burned *Sertorius* papers vnper-
used.

*Vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, siue irascatur, siue
videat, non inueniet requiem.* Here is described the great
disadvantage which a wise man hath in vndertaking
a lighter person then himselfe, which is such an in-
gemente, as whether a man turne the matter to
ieast, or turne it to heate; or howsoeuer hee change
cotype, hee can no wayes quitte himselfe well of
it.

*Qui delicate à pueritia nutrit seruum suum, postea
sentiet eum contumacem.* Heere is signified that if a
man beginne too highe a pitche in his faoures, it
doeth commonly end in vnkindnesse, and vnthank-
fulnesse.

*Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo, coram regibus stabit
nec erit inter ignobiles.* Here is obserued that of all ver-
tues for rising to honoure, quicknesse of dispatche is
the best; for superiours many times loue not to haue
those they imploy too deep, or too sufficient, but redy
and diligent.

*Vidi cunctos viuentes, qui ambulant sub sole cum ado-
lescente*

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adolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo. Here is expre-
ssed that which was noted by *Sylla* first, and after him
by *Tiberius*; *Plures adorant solem orientem, quam occiden-
tem vel meridianum.*

*Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te,
locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia Curatio faciet cessare
peccata maxima.* Here caution is giuen that vpon
displeasure, retiring is of all courses the vnfittest;
for a man leaueth thinges at worst, and depri-
ueth himselfe of meanes to make them bet-
ter.

*Erat Ciuitas parua & pauci in ea viri; venit contra
eam rex magnus, & vadavit eam, instruxitque
munitiones per Gyrum, & perfecta est obsidio, inuentusque
est in ea vir pauper & sapiens, & liberauit eam per sapi-
entiam suam, & nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis
illius pauperis;* Here the corruptions of states is sette
foorth; that esteeme not vertue or merite longer then
they haue vse of it.

Mollis responsio frangit iram. Here is noted that si-
lence or rough Answere, exasperateth: but an an-
swear present and temperate pacifieth.

Iter pigrorum, quasi sepes spinarum. Here is liue-
lye represented how laborious sloth prooueth in the
end; for when thinges are differred till the laste
instant, and nothing prepared before hande, euerye
stepp findeth a Bryer or Impediment, which catcheth
or stoppeth.

Melior est finis orationis quam principium. Here is tax-
ed the vanitie of formall speakers, that study more

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about prefaces and inducements, then vpon the conclusions and issues of speache.

Qui cognoscit in iudicio faciem; non bene facit, iste et pro buccellapanis deseret veritatem. Here is noted that a iudge were better be a briber, then a respecter of persons: for a corrupt Iudge offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

Vir pauper calumniatus pauperes, similis est imbrivementi, in quo paratur fames; here is expressed the extremitie of necessitous extortions, figured in the aunciente fable of the full and the hungry horse-leech.

Fons turbatus pede, & vena corrupta, est iustus cadens cecram impio; here is noted that one iudiciall and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountaines of Iustice more, then many particuler Iniuries passed over by conuience.

Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre & a matre, & dicit hoc non esse peccatum, participes est homicidij; here is noted that whereas men in wronging theyr best frindes, vse to extenuate their faulte, as if they moughte presume or bee bo'de vpon them, it doth contrariwise indeede aggrauate their fault, & turneth it from Iniury to impiety.

Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso; here caution is giuen that in the election of our friends wee doe principalliy avoide those which are impatiente, as those that will espouse vs to many factions and quarrels.

Qui

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Qui conturbat domum suam possidebit ventum; here is noted that in domesticall separations & breaches men doe promise to themselves quietting of their minde and contentement, but still they are deceived of their expectation, and it turneth to winde.

Filius sapiens letificat patrem, filius vero stultus maestitia est matri suae. Here is distinguished that fathers haue moste comfote of the good prooffe of their sonnes; but mothers haue moste discomfort of their ill prooffe, because women haue little discerning of vertue but of fortune.

Qui celat delictum querit amicitiam, sed qui altero sermone repetit, seperat federatos; here caution is giuen that reconcilment is better managed by an Amnesty and passing ouer that which is past, then by Apologies and excusations.

In omni opere bono erit abundantia, ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas; here is noted that words and discourse aboundeth moste, where there is idlenesse and want.

Primus in sua causa iustus, sed venit altera pars, & inquires in eum; Here is obserued that in all causes the first tale possesseth much, in sorte, that the preiudice, thereby wrought wil bee hardly remooued, excepte some abuse or falsitie in the Information be detected.

Verba linguis quasi simplicia, & ipsa perueniunt ad interiora ventris; there is distinguished that flattery and insinuation which seemeth set and artificiall,

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sinketh

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finke:th not farre, but that entreth deepe, which hath shewe of nature, libertie, and simplicitie,

Qui crudelis deriso rem, ipse sibi iniuriam facit & qui arguit Impium sibi maculam gerit. Here caution is giuen howe wee tender reprehension to arrogante and scornfull natures, whose manner is to esteeme it for contumely, and accordingly to retourne, it,

Da sapienti occasionem & addeat ei sapientia, Here is distinguished the wisdom, brought into habite, and that which is but verball and swimming onely in conceite: for the one vpon the occasione presented is quickned and redoubled: the other is amazed and confused.

Quo modo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glasse; wherein the Images of all diuersitie of Natures & Customs are representēd, frō which representatiō proceedeth that application,
Qui sapit innumeris moribus aptus erit,

Thus haue I staide some what longer vpon these sentences polittique of Salomon, then is agreeable to the proportion of an example: ledde with a desire to giue authority to this parte of knoweledge, which I noted as deficiente by so excellent a presidente: and haue also attended them with brieue obseruations, such as to my vnderstandinge, offer noe violence to the sence, though I knowe they may bee applyed to a more diuine vse:
but

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But it is allowed euen in diuinity, that some Interpretations, yea and some writings haue more of the *Eagle*, then others: But takinge them as Instructions for life, they moughte haue receiued large discourse, if I woulde haue broken them and illustrated them by diducements and examples.

Neither was this in vse only with the hebrews, But it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more auncient Times: that as men founde out any obseruation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and expresse it in parable, or Aphorisme, or fable. But for fables they were vicegerents & supplies, where Examples failed: Nowe that the times abounde with historie, the Ayme is better when the marke is aliue. And therefore the fourme of writing which of al others is fittest for this variable argumente of Negotiation and occasions is that which *Machiavel* chose wisely and aptly for Governement: namely discourse vpon Histories or Examples. For knoweledge drawne freshly and in our view out of particulers, knoweth the waie best to particulers againe. And it hath much greater life for practise: when the discourse attendeth vpon the Example, then when the example attendeth vpon the discourse. For this is no pointe of order as it seemeth at firste but of substance. For when the Example is the ground being set downe in an historie at large, it is set downe with al circumstances: which maye sometimes controul the discourse thereupon

who calling
hath imitated
upon Juicia

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thereupon made, and sometimes supply it; as a verie pattern for games; whereas the Examples alledged for the discourses sake, are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a seruile aspect towards the discourse, which they are brought in to make good.

But this difference is not amisse to bee remembered, that as historye of *Tymes* is the best ground for discourse of Gouvernement, such as *Machyauel* handleth; so Histories of *Liues* is the moſte proper for discourse of businesse is more conuersante in priuate Actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose, fitter then them both which is *discourse upon letters*, such as are wise and weightie, as manie are of *Cicero ad Atticum* and others. For letters haue a greate and more particular representation of businesse, then either *Chronicles* or *Liues*. Thus haue wee spoken both of the matter and forme of this parte of Ciuile knowledge touching Negotiation, which wee note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much frō that wherof we haue spokē as *sapere*, & *sibi Sapere*: the one moouing as it were to the circumference, the other to the center: for there is a wisdom of counsell, and againe there is a wisdom of pressing a mans owne fortune; and they doe sometimes meet, and often seuer. For many are wise in their owne ways, that are weak for govern;

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gouernment or Counsell, like Ants which is a wise creature for it self, but very hurtfull for the garden. This wisdom the Romanes did take much knoweledge of; *Nam pol sapiens* (saith the Comickall Poet) *Fingit fortunam sibi*, and it grewe to an adage, *Faber quisque fortuna proprie*: and *Liue* attributeth it to *Cato* the first, *In hoc viro tanta vis animi & ingenij inerat, vt quocunq; loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videre tur.*

This conceit or position if it bee too much declared and professed, hath beene thoughte a thinge impolitique and vnlucky, as was obserued in *Timotheus* the Athenian: who hauinge done manie greate seruices to the Estate in his gouernmēt and giuinge an accounte thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude euery particuler with this Clause, And in this fortune had noe part And it came so to passe that hee neuer prospered in any thinge hee tooke in hande afterwarde: for this is too high and too arrogant favouring of that which *Ezechiel* saith of *Pharaob*: *Dicis: fluuus est meus & ego feci memet ipsum*: or of that which another prophette speaketh: That men offer Sacrifices to their nettes and snares, and that which the Poett expresseth, *Dextra mihi Deus, & telum quod inuisibile libro.*

Nunc adsinte:

For these confidences were euer vnhalloved, and vnbleſſed. And therefore those that were great Politiques indeede euer alcribed their successes to their felicitie: and not to their skill or

vertue

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vertue. For so Sylla surnamed himselfe *Fælix*, not *Magnus*. So *Cæsar* saide to the Maister of the shippe, *Cæsarem portas & fortunam eius.*

But yet neuerthelesse these Positions *Faber quisq; fortune sue, sapiens dominabitur astris: Innia virtuti nulla est via,* and the like, being takē and vsed as spurs to Industry, and not as stirops to insolency rather for resolution then for presumption or outwarde declaration, haue beene euer thoughte sounde and good, and are no question imprinted in the greatest mindes: who are so sensible of this opinion, as they can scarce containe it within. As we see in *Augustus Cæsar* (who was rather diuerse from his vnclē, then, inferiour in vertue) how when he died, he desired his friends aboute him to giue him a *Plaudite*: as if hee were conscience to himselfe that he had played his parte wel vpon the stage. This parte of knowledge we doe reporte also as deficient: not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not beene reduced to writinge. And therefore least it shoulde seme to any that it is not comprehensible by Axiome, It is requisite as wee did in the former, that wee set down some heads or passages of it.

*Faber
Fortu-
ne siue
de Am-
bitu
vita.*

Wherein it maye appeare at the first a newe and vnwoonted Argumente to teach men how to raise and make their fortune, a doctrine wherein euery man perchance will bee ready to yeeld himselfe a disciple til he seethe difficulty: for fortune layeth as heauy impositions as *vertue*; and it is as harde and severe a thinge to bee a true *Pollitique*

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politique, as to be truelye *morall*. But the handlinge hereof, concerneth learning greatly, both in honour, and in substance: In honour, because pragmaticall men may not goe away with an opinion that learning is like a Larke that can mount, and singe, and please her selfe, and nothing else; but may knowe that she houldeth as well of the hauke that can soare aloft, and can also descend and strike vpon the pray. In substance, because it is the perfitte lawe of enquiry of trueth, *That nothing bee in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of Crystall, or Fourme,* that is, that there be uot any thing in being & action, which should not bee drawne and collected into contemplation and doctrine: Neyther doth learning admire or esteeme of this Architecture of fortune, otherwise then as of an inferiour worke; For no mans fortune can be an end woorthy of his being, and many times the woorthiest men doe abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but neuerthelesse fortune as an organ of vertue and merit deserueth the consideration.

First therefore the precept which I conceiue to bee most summary, towards the preuayling in fortune; is to obtaine that windowe which *Momus* did require, who seeing in the frame of mans heart, such Angles and recesses, founde fault there was not a windowe to looke into them: that is, to procure good informacions of particulars touching persons, their Natures, their desires & ends, their customs

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and fashions, theyr helpes and aduantages, and wherby they cheesly stand; so againe their weaknesse and disaduantages, and where they lye most open and obnoxious, their friendes, factions, dependaunces: and againe theyr opposites, enuiors, competitors, theyr moods, and times, *Sola viri molles adytus, & tempora noras* theyr principles, rules, and obseruacions: and the like; And this not onely of persons, but of actions: what are on foote from time to time: and how they are conducted, fauoured, opposed; and how they importe: and the like; For the knowledge of present Actions, is not onely materiall in it selfe, but without it also, the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whiles they are in pursuite, they are one, and when they retourne to theyr Nature, they are another. These Informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the *minor* propositions in euery actiue syllogisme, for no excellencye of obseruacions (which are as the *maior* propositions) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

That this knowledge is possible, *Salomon* is our surety who sayeth. *Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda, sed vir prudens exhauriet illud*: And although the knowledge it selfe falleth not vnder precept, because it is of Individuals, yet the Instructions for the obtaining of it may.

We will beginne therefore with this precept, according to the aunciente opinion, that the Synewes
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of wisdome, are slownesse of beleefe, and distrust: That more trust bee ginen to Countenances and Deedes, then to wordes: and in wordes, rather to suddaine passages, and surprised wordes: then to set and purposed wordes: Neither let that be feared which is sayde, *fronti nulla fides*, which is meant of a generall outward behauiour, and not of the priuare and subtile mocions and labours of the countenance and gesture, which as *Q. Cicero* elegantly sayth, is *Asini ianua*, the gate of the Mynd: None more close then *Tiberius*, and yet *Tacitus* sayth of *Gallus*, *Etenim vultu offensionem coniectauerat*. So againe noting the differing Character and manner of his commending *Germanicus* and *Drusus* in the *Senate*: he sayeth, touching his fashion wherein hee carried his speeche of *Germanicus*, thus: *Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire crederetur*, but of *Drusus* thus, *Paucioribus sed intentior, & fida oratione*: and in another place speaking of his character of speech, when he did any thing that was gracious and popular, he sayeth, that in other thinges hee was *velut e luētantium verberum*: but then againe, *Solutius loquebatur quando subueniret*. So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation: nor noe such commaunded countenance (*vultus iustus*), that can seuer from a fained tale, some of these fashions, either a more sleight and carelesse fashion, or more set & formall, or more tedious and wandring: or comming from, a mā more drily and hardly.

Neither are *Deedes* such assured pledges, as that

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they may be trusted without a iudicious cōsideraciō of their magnitude and nature; *Fraus sibi in paruis fidem praestruit, ut maiore emolumento fallat*: and the Italian thinketh himselfe vpon the point to be bought and sold: when he is better vsed then he was woont to be without manifest cause. For small faoures, they doe but lull men a sleepe, both as to *Caution*, and as to *Industry*, and are as *Demosthenes* calleth them, *Alimenta socordiae*. So againe we see, how false the nature of some *deeds* are in that particular, which *Mutianus* practised vpon *Antonius Primus*, vpon that hollowe and vnfaithfull reconcilment, which was made between them: whereupon *Mutianus* aduanced many of the friends of *Antonius*: *Simul amicis eius praefecturas & tribunatus largitur*: wherein vnder pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependances.

As for words (though they be like waters to Phisitions, full of flattery and vncertainty) yet they are not to be dispised, specially with the aduantage of passion and affection. For so wee see *Tyberius* vpon a stinging and incensing speech of *Agrippina*, came a step foorth of his dissimulacion when he sayd, *You are hurt, because you doe not raigne*: of which *Tacitus* sayeth, *Audita haec, raram occulti pectoris vocem elicere: correptamque Graeco versu admonuit: ideo laedi quia non regnaret*. And therefore the Poet doth elegantly cal passions, tortures, that vrge men to confesse theyr secrets.

Vino tortus & ira.

And

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And experience sheweth, there are few men so true to themselues, and so settled; but that sometimes vpon heate, sometimes vpon brauerye, sometime: vpon kindenesse, sometimes vpon trouble of minde and weaknesse, they open themselues; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulatiō, according to the prouerb of Spain, *Di mentira, y sacar as verdad*: Tell a lye, and find a truth.

As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from Reportes: mens weakenesse and faultes are best knowne from theyr Enemies, theyr vertues, and abilityes from theyr friendes; theyr customes and Times from theyr seruantes: their conceites and opinions from theyr familiar friends, with whom they discourse most. Generall fame is light, & the opinions conceiued by superiors or equals are deceitful: for to such men are more masked, *Verior fama e domesticis emanat*.

But the soundest diselosing and expounding of men is, by theyr natures and endes, wherein the weakest sorte of men are best interpreted by theyr Natures, and the wisest by theyr endes. For it was both pleasauntlye and wiselye sayde (though I thinke verye vntreuely) by a Nuntio of the pope, returning from a certayne Nation, where hee serued as *LIDGER*: whose opinion beeing asked touching the appointement of one to goe in his place, hee wished that in anye case they did not send one that was too wise: because no very wise man would euer imagine, what they in that country were.

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were like to doe: And certaynelye, it is an error frequent, for men to shoot ouer, and to suppose deeper ends, and more compasse reaches then are: the Italian prouerb being elegant, & for the most part true.

*Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
C'è manco che non credi:*

There is commonly lesse mony. lesse wisdom, and lesse good faith, then men doe accompt vpon: But Princes vpon a farre other Reason are best interpreted by their natures, and priuate persons by their ends, For Princes being at the toppe of humane desires, they haue for the most part no particular endes, whereto they aspire: by distaunce from which a man mought take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and desires. which is one of the causes that maketh their heartes more inscrutable: Neyther is it sufficient to informe our selues in mens endes and natures of the variety of them onely, but also of the predominancy what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so wee see, when *Tigellinus* sawe himselfe out-stripped by *Petronius Turpilianus* in Neroes humours of pleasures *Metus eius rinaeur*, he wrought vpon Neroes fears, wherby he brake the others neck.

But to all this parte of Enquierie, the most compendious waye resteth in three thinges: The first to haue generall acquaintaunce and inwardnesse with those which haue generall atquaintance, and looke most into the worlde: and speciallye according to the

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the diuersitie of Businesse, and the diuersitye of Persons, to haue priuacye and conuersation with some one friend at least which is parfite and well intelligenced in euery feuerall kinde. The seconde is to keepe a good mediocritye in libertie of speeche, and secrecy, in most thinges libertye: secrecy where it importeth: for libertye of speeche inuiter h and prouoketh libertye to be vsed againe: and so bringeth much to a mans knowledge: and secrecie on the other side induceth trust and inwardnesse. The last is the reducing of a mans selfe to this watchfull and serene habite, as to make accompte and purpose in euery conference and action, as well to obserue as to acte. For as *Epictetus* would haue a Philosopher in euery particular action to say to himselfe, *Et hoc volo, & etiam institutum seruare*: so a politique man in euery thing should say to himselfe; *Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addicere*. I haue staied the longer vpon this precept of obtaining good information, because it is a maine part by it selfe, which aunswereth to all the rest. But aboue al things, Caution must be taken, that Men haue a good staye and houlde of themselues, and that this much knowing doe not draw on much meddling: For nothing is more vnfortunate then light and rash intermeddling in many matters: So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but onely to this, to make a better & freer choise of those actions, which may concern vs, & to conduct them with the lesse error and the more dexterity.

The second precept concerning this knowledge is for

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for men to take good information touching theyre own person and well to vnderstand themselves: knowing that as *S. James* sayth, though men looke oft in a glasse, yet they do sodainly forget themselves, wherein as the diuine glasse is the word of God, so the politique glasse is the state of the world, or times wherein we liue: In the which we are to behould our selues.

For men ought to take an vnpartiall viewe of their owne abilities and vertues: and againe of their wants and impediments; accounting these with the most, & those other with the least, and from this view and examination to frame the considerations following.

First to consider how the constitution of their nature forteth with the generall state of the times: which if they find agreeable and fit, then in all things to giue themselves more scope and liberty, but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of theyr life to be more close retyred and reserued: as we see in *Tyberius* who was neuer seen at a play: and came not into the Senate in 12. of his last yeers: whereas *Augustus Caesar* liued euer in mens eyes, which *Tacitus* obserueth, *Alia Tiberio morum via.*

Secondly to consider how their Nature forteth with professions and courses of life, & accordingly to make election if they be free, and if ingaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity: as we see was doone by *Duke Valentine*, that was designed by his father to a sacerdo tal profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination being such neuertheless, as a man cannot tel wel whether they were worse
for

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for a Prince or for a Priest,

Thirdly to consider how they sorte with those whom they are like to haue Competitors and Concurrents and to take that course wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent: as *Caesar Iulius* did, who at first was an Orator or Pleader but when he saw the excellency of *Cicero*, *Hortensius*, *Catulus*, and others for eloquence, and sawe there was no man of reputation for the warres but *Pompeius* vpon whom the State was forced to relie; he forsooke his course begun toward a ciuile and popular greatnesse; and transferred his designes to a martiall greatnesse.

Fourthly in the choyse of their friends, and dependances, to proceed according to the Composition of their own nature, as we may see in *Caesar*, all whose friends and followers were men active and effectually, but not solemn or of reputation.

Fiftly to take speciall heed how they guide themselves by examples, in thinking they can doe as they see others doe: whereas perhappes their natures and carriages are farre differing; in which Error, it seemeth *Pompey* was, of whome *Cicero* sayeth, that hee was woont often to saye: *Sylla potuit; Ego non potero?* wherein he was much abused, the natures and proceedings of himselfe and his example, being the vniikest in the worlde, the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of Maiesty and circumstance, and therefore the lesse effectually,

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But this precept touching the politicke knowledge of our selues hath many other branches whereupon we cannot insit:

Next to the wellvnderstanding and discerning of a mans selfe, there followeth the well opening and reuealing a mans selfe, wherein we see nothing more vsuall then for the more able man to make the lesse shewe. For there is a greate aduantage in the well setting foorth of a mans vertues, fortunes, merites, and againe in the artificiall couering of a mans weakenesses, defectes, disgraces, staying vpon the one flyding from the other, cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by exposition, and the like; wherein we see what *Tacitus* sayth of *Mu- tianus*, who was the greatest politique of his time, *Omniū que dixerat feceratque, arte quadam ostentator*: which requireth indeed some arte, least it turne tedious and arrogant, but yet so; as ostentation (though it be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in Manners, then in Policye; for as it is sayd, *Audacter calumniari, semper aliquid heret*, So except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity *Audacter te vendita semper aliquid heret*. For it will sticke with the more ignorant and inferiour sort of men, though men of wisdom and ranke doe smile at it and despise it, and yet the authority wonne with many, doth counteruaile the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and gouernement, as with a naturall pleasaunt and ingenious fashion, or at times when it is mixte with some perill and vn-

safety

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safety, (as in Military persons) or at tymes when others are most enuid; or with easie and carelesse passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious: or with an equall freedome of taxing a mans selfe, as well as gracing himselfe, or by occasion of repelling or putting downe others iniurye or insolencie: It doth greatly adde to reputation; and surelye not a fewe solide natures, that wante this ventositye, and cannot faile in the heighth of the windes, are not without some preiudice and disaduantage by theyre moderation.

But for these flourishes and inhancements of vertue, as they are not perchaunce vnecessary: So it is at leaste, necessary that vertue be not disualewed and imbased vnder the iust price: which is doon in three manners; By offering and obtruding a mans selfe; wherein men thinke he is rewarded when he is accepted. By doing too much, which wil not giue that which is well done leaue to settle, and in the end induceth satiety: and: By finding to soone the fruit of a mans vertue, in commendation, applaule, honour, fauoure, wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him heare what is truly said, *Cave ne insuetus rebus maioribus videaris, si hac te res parua sicuti magna delectat*:

But the couering of defectes is of no lesse importance, then the valewing of good parts: which may be doone likewise in three manners, by *Caution*, by *Colour*, and by *Confidence*. *Caution* is, when men doe

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ingeniously and discretely auoyde to be put into those things for which they are not proper: where as contrarywise bold and vnquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and proclaime all their wantes; Coloure is when men make a way for themselves, to haue a construction made of their faultes or wantes: as proceedinge from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose: for of the one, it is well sayde;

Sape latet vitium proximitate boni.

And therefore whatsoeuer want a man hath, he must seee that he pretend the vertue that shadoweth it, as if he be *Dull*, he must affect *Gravitie*, if a *Coward*, *Mildnesse*, and so the rest: for the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not doe his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities: and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities, which are notorious in him to giue colour that his true wantes are but industries and dissimulationis: for *Confidence* it is the last but the surest remedie: namely to depreesse and seeme to despise whatsoeuer a man cannot attaine, obseruing the good principle of the Marchantes, who endeouour to raise the price of their owne commodities, and to beate down the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other, which is to face off a mans own defects: in seeming to conceiue that he is best in those things wherein he is failing: and to help that againe, to seeme on the other side that he hath

least

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least opinion of himselfe, in those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in Poets, that if they shew their verses, and you except to any, they will say, *That that lyne cost them more labour then any of the rest*: and presently will seeme to disable, and suspect rather *some other lyne*, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But aboue all in this righting and helping of a mans selfe in his owne carriage, he must take heed he shew not himselfe dismantled and exposed to scorne and iniury, by too much dulcenesse, goodnesse, and facility of nature, but shew some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage with a ready rescuffing of a mans selfe from scornes, is somtimes of necessity imposed vpon men by somewhat in their person or fortune, but it euer succeedeth with good felicity.

Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeauour, to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth mens fortunes so much as this: *Idem manebat, neque idem decebat*. Men are where they were; when occasions turne, and therefore to *Cato*, whom *Liuius* maketh such an Architect of fortune, hee addeth that he had *Versatile Ingenium*: And thereof it cometh that these graue solemne wittes which must be like themselves, and cannot make departures haue more dignity then foelicity: But in some it is nature to bee somewhat viscoue and inwrapped,

and

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and not easie to turne: In some it is a conceipt, that is almost a nature, which is that men can hardlie make themselvs beleue that they oughte to change their course, when they haue found good by it in former experience. For *Macciaue* noteth wisely how *Fabius Maximus* would haue been temporizing still, according to his ould biasse, when the nature of the warre was altered, and required hotte pursuite; In some other it is want of point and penetration in their iudgemente, that they do not discern when things haue a periode, but come in, too late after the occasion: As *Demosthenes* compareth the people of *Athens* to country fellowes, when they play in a fence-schoole, that if they haue a blow then they remooue their weapon to that warde, and not before: In some other it is a loathnesse to leese labours passed, and a conceite that they can bring about occasions to their plie, and yet in the end, when they see no other remedye, then they come to it with disadvantage, as *Tarquinius* that gaue for the third part of *Sybillas* booke the treble price, when he mought at first haue had all three for the simple. But from whatsoeuer roote or cause this Restiuenesse of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most preiudiciall, and nothing is more politique then to make the wheels of our mind concentricque and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that vve last spake of, but with difference is that which is well expressed, *satis accede*

Deis-

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Deisque, that men do not only turne with the occasions but also runne with the occasions and not strain their credit or strength to ouer-harde or extreame points: but choose in their actions that which is most passable: for this will preferue men from foyle, not occupy them too much about one matter, winne opinion of moderation, please the moste, and make a shoue of a perpetuall foelicitye in all they vndertake, which cannot but mightely increase reputation.

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to haue some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I vnderstand it, and it is that which *Demosthenes* vttereth in high tearmes: *Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat Imperator: sic & a cordatis viris res ipse ducenda, ut qua ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, & non ipse euentus persequi cogantur.* For if we obserue, we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency, in managing of businesse: some can make vse of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plotte little: some can vrge and pursue their owne plottes well, but cannot accommodate: nor take in: either of vvhich is very vnperfite without the other.

Another part of this knowledge is the obseruing a good mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a mans selfe, for although depth of secrecy, and making way (*qualis est via nauis in Mari*, which the French calleth *Sourdes Menees*, when men set things in worke without opening themselues at all) be sometimes

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times both prosperous and admirable : yet many times *Dissimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant.* And therefore we see the greatest politiques haue in a naturall and free-manner professed their desires, rather then bin reserued and disguised in them. For so we see that *Lucius Sylla* made a kind of profession, *That hee wished all men happy or unhappie as they stood his friendes or enemies* : So *Cesar*, when hee went first into *Gaul*, made no scruple to professe, *that hee had rather bee first in a village, then second at Rome.* So againe as soone as hee had begunne the warre, we see what *Cicero* sayth of him, *Alter* (meaning of *Cesar*) *non recusat, sed quodam modo postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur Tyrannus.* So we may see in a letter of *Cicero* to *Atticus*, that *Augustus Caesar* in his very entrance into affaires, when he was a darling of the Senate, yet in his haranges to the people, would swear *Ita parentis honores consequi liceat,* (which was no lesse then the Tyranny,) saue that to helpe it, hee would stretch forth his hand towards a statua of *Cesars*, that was erected in the place : and men laughed and woondered and sayde, Is it possible, or did you euer heare the like, and yet though hee meant no hurte, hee did it so handsomlye and ingenuouslye, and all these were prosperous, whereas *Pempeye* who tended to the same ends, but in a more darke and dissembling manner, as *Tacitus* sayeth of him, *Occultior non melior,* wherein *Salust* concurrereth ore probo, animo inuerecundo,

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do made it his disseigne by infinite secret Engines, to cast the state into an absolute Anarchy and confusion, that the state mought cast it selfe into his Armes for necessity and protection, and so the soueraigne power bee putt vpon him, and he neuer seene in it : and when hee had broughte it (as he thoughte) to that pointe when hee was chosen *Consull* alone, as neuer any, was, yet hee could make noe greate matter of it, because men vnderstoode him not : but was faine in the end, to goe the beaten tracke of getting Armes into his handes, by coulour of of the doubt of *Cesars* designes: so tedious, casuall, and vnfürfortunate are these deepe dissimulations, whereof it seemeth *Tacitus* made this iudgement, that they were a cunning of an inferiour fourme in regard of true pollicy, attributing the one to *Augustus*, the other to *Tiberius*, where speaking of *Liua*, he sayth: *Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filij bene composita:* for surely the continuall habite of dissimulation is but a weake and sluggish cunning, & not greatly politique.

Another precept of this Architecture of Fortune, is, to accustome our mindes to iudge of the proportion or valewe of things, as they conduce, and are materiall to our particular ends, and that to doe substantially and nor superficially. For wee shall finde the Logickall parte (as I maye tearme it) of some mens mindes good, but the Mathematicall part erroneous, that is, they can well iudge of consequences, but not of proportions and

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comparison, preferring things of shewe and sence before things of substance and effect. So some fall in loue with access to Princes, others with popular fame and applaue, supposinge they are things of greate purchase, when in many Cases they are but matters of Enuy, perill, and Impediment:

So some measure things accordinge to the labour and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent about them; and thinke if they bee euer movinge, that they must needs aduance and procede, as *Caesar* saith in a dispisinge manner of *Cato* the second, when hee describeth howe laborious and indefatigable he was to noe greate purpose: *Hæc omnia magno studio agebat*. So in moste things men are ready to abuse themselues in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should bee the fittest.

As for the true marshalling of mens pursutes towards their fortune as they are more or lesse materiall, I houlde them to stand thus; Firste the amendment of their own Minds. For the Remooue of the Impediments of the mind wil sooner cleare the passages of fortune, then the obtaininge fortune wil remooe the Impediments of the mind; In secōd place I set downe wealth and meanes, which I know most men woulde haue placed firste: because of the generall vse which it beareth towards all yarietic of occasions. But that opinon I may condemne with like reason as *Macchiauell* doth that other: that monies werethe sinews of the warres, wheras (saith he)

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the true sinews of the warres are the sinews of mens Armes, that is a valiant, populous and Military Nation: & he voucheth aptly the authority of *Solon* who when *Cresus* shewed him his treasury of goulde saide to him, that if another came that had better Iron, he woulde be maister of his Gould. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not monies that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews, and steele of mens Mynds, Witte, Courage, Audacity, Resolution, Temper, Industry, and the like: In thirde place I set downe Reputation, because of the peremptory Tides & Currants it hath, which if they bee not taken in their due time, are sildome recouered, it beinge extreame harde to plaie an after game of reputation. And lastly, I place honoure, which is more easily wonne by any of the other three, much more by all, then any of them can bee purchased by honour. To conclude this precepte, as there is order and priority in Matter, so is there in Time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest Errors: while men fly to their ends when they shoulde intend their beginnings: and doe not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshall them according to greatnes and not according to instance, not obseruing the good precepte *Quod nunc instat agamus*.

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to imbrace any matters, which doe occupie to great a quantity of time, but to haue that sounding in a mans eares.

D d 2

Sed

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Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus, and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions of Burden, as Lawyers, Orators painefull diuines, and the like, are not commonlie so politique for their owne fortune, otherwise then in their ordinary way, because they want time to learne particulars, to waite occasions, and to deuise plottes.

Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature which doth nothing in vaine, which surely a man may do, if he do well interlace his businesse, and bend not his mind too much vpon that which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in euery particular action, so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to haue one thing vnder another, as if he cannot haue that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to haue it in a second, or so in a third, and if he can haue no parte of that which he purposed, yet to turn the vse of it to somewhat els, and if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come, and if he can contriue no effect or substance from it, yet to win som good opinion by it, or the like so that he should exact an account of himself of euery action, to reape somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he faile of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impolitique then to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that dooth so, leeseeth infinite occasions which enterveine, and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat, that he shall need afterwards: then for that which he

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he vrgeth for the present; and therefore men must be partite in that rule: *Hæc oportet facere, & illa non omittere.*

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a mans selfe peremptorily in any thing, though it seem not liable to accident, but euer to haue a window to flie out at, or a way to retyre; following the wisdom in the ancient fable, of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was drie, whether they should go: and the one mooued to go down into a pit because it was not likely the water would dry there, but the other answered, *True, but if it do, how shall we get out againe?*

Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of *Bias*, construed not to any point of perfidiousnesse, but only to caution and moderation *Et amicum tanquam inimicum futurum, & odium tanquam amorem:* For it vtterly betraieith al vtility, for me to imbarque themselves to far, into vnfortunate friendships: troublesome spleans; & childish & humorous enuies or æmulations.

But I continue this beyond the measure of an example, led, because I wold not haue such knowledges which I note as *deficient* to be thought things Imaginatiue, or in the ayre; or an obseruation or two, much made of. but thinges of bulke and masse: whereof an end is hardlier made, then a beginning. It must be likewise conceiued that in these pointes which I mencion and set downe, they are far from complete tractates of them: but onely as small peeces for patternes: And lastlye, no man I suppose will thinke

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thinke, that I meane fortunes are not obtained without all this adoe; For I know they come tumbling into some mens lappes, and a number obtaine good fortunes by dilligence, in a plaine way: Little intermedlinge: and keeping themselues from grosse errors.

But as Cicero when he setteth down an *Idea* of a parfit Orator, doth not mean that euery pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a Prince or a Courtier hath been described by such as haue handled those subjects, the mould hath vsed to be made accordinge to the perfectiō of the Arte, and not according to cōmon praētise. So I vnderstand it that it ought to be done in the description of a *Pollitique* man. I meane pollitique for his owne fortune.

But it must be remembred al this while, that the precepts which we haue set down, are of that kind which may be couēted & called *Bona Artes*, as for euill arts, if a man would set down for himselfe that principle of *Machiauel*: That a man seeke not to attaine vertue it selfe: But the apparance onely thereof, because the credite of vertue is a helpe, but the vse of it is cumber: or that other of his principles: That he presupposeth, that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by feare, and therefore that he seeke to haue euery mā obnoxious, lowe, & in strait which, the *Italians* call *seminar spine*, to lowe thornes: or that other principle cōteined in the verse which Cicero cyteth *cadant amici, dumode Inimici intercidat*, as the *Triumvirs* which sould euery one to other the liues of their friends for the deaths of their enemies: or

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that other protestation of *L. Catilina* to set on fire & trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, & to vnwrappe their fortunes. *Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam*, or that other principle of *Lysander* That childre are to be deceiued with cōfittes, & men with othes, & the like euil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in al things) there are more in number then of the good: Certainly with these dispensations from the lawes of charity & integrity the pressing of a mans fortune, may be more hasty and compendious. But it is in life, as it is in ways. The shortest way is comonly the fowlest: & surely the fairer way is not much about.

But men if they be in their own power & doe beare & sustaine themselues, and bee not caryed away with a whirlewinde or tempest of ambition: oughte in the pursute of their owne fortune, to set before their eies, not only that general Map of the world. That al things are vanity & vexatio of spirit, but many other more particular Cards & directiōs, chiefly that, That Being, without wel being: is a curse, & the greater being, the greater curse. And that all vertue is most rewarded, & al wickednesse most punished in it selfe: according as the Poet saith excellently.

*Quae vobis que digna viri, pro laudibus istis
Premia posse rear solui pulcherrima primum.*

Dij moresque dabunt vestri.

And so of the contrary. And secondly they oughte to looke vp to the eternal prouidence and diuine iudgemente, which often subuerteth the wisdom of euill plot